A Online Appendix Tables

Rachel E. Brulé[1]

Table A.1. Descriptive statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	280805.24	283301.58	285668.90	2367.32
				(0.08)
% women in the subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.53	0.48	−0.05
				(−1.99)
Village population: first panchayat period	4870.86	4700.90	5275.92	575.01
				(0.62)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat	12.15	12.31	11.80	−0.51
				(−0.80)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.21	0.22	0.19	−0.04
				(−1.44)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.10	0.10	0.10	−0.01
				(−0.17)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.37	0.39	0.31	−0.08
				(−1.63)
% Hindu in village population currently	0.87	0.87	0.87	−0.01
				(−0.17)
% Muslims in village population currently	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.01
				(0.62)
% SCs in village population currently	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−1.02)
% STs in village population currently	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.04
				(1.42)
% OBCs in village population currently	0.09	0.08	0.13	0.05
				(1.82)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population currently	0.26	0.27	0.26	−0.01
				(−0.44)
% own land in village population currently	0.47	0.48	0.45	−0.04
				(−1.11)
Average price: unirrigated land currently (Rs.)	103740.33	113642.86	90859.38	−22783.48
				(−1.03)
Average price: residential land currently (Rs.)	417181.82	432931.30	406238.10	−26693.20
				(−0.36)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.19	0.17	0.23	0.06
				(1.06)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.07
				(1.28)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.15	0.15	0.13	−0.02
				(−0.38)
Number of villages	240	151	82	

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

[1]Assistant Professor of Global Development Policy, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University. Email: rebrule@bu.edu

Table A.2. Balance Test: Father's Death Post vs. Pre-Reservations

	(1) All States	(2) Father Dies Post Reservations	(3) Pre Reservations	(4) difference (t-score)
Grandfather: secondary or more education	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.01
				(1.15)
Grandmother: secondary or more education	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.00
				(−0.33)
Landed patriarch (percent)	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.00
				(0.22)
Parents = top 20% landholders	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.00
				(0.11)
Subject to Hindu law (Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist)	0.95	0.96	0.95	−0.01
				(−1.61)
Patriarch: Low Caste	0.73	0.71	0.73	0.02
				(1.29)
Endogenous variables				
Age (years)	30.26	31.23	37.07	5.83
				(25.56)
Education (years completed)	5.61	4.27	5.13	0.86
				(8.69)
Siblings: proportion of sisters	0.41	0.39	0.46	0.08
				(17.84)
Inherit land?	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.06
				(13.87)
Total land inherited	0.20	0.08	0.33	0.24
				(8.35)
Observations	19396	5984	4774	

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9 Village level means are provided. The sample includes all landed Hindus who were born pre-Hindu Succession Act and pre-Hindu Succession Amendment Act in their own state. For parental landholdings, I consider the subset of children with fathers who are no longer living to ensure reported wealth is not strategically reported to influence future inheritance distribution. I take age as endogenous as older fathers are likely to pass away sooner. Prior work also shows that parents' investment in education and proportion of sisters is affected by property rights reform (Anderson and Genicot 2015; Rosenblum 2015; Roy 2015; Bhalotra et al. 2017; Lawry et al. 2016). Finally, this work shows that land inheritance and the amount of land inherited are also affected by reform. Column (4) displays beta coefficients, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.3. Reservation's impact on *Pradhan's* gender

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All-NR	(4) All-NR-late
Pradhan seat is reserved for women	0.89***	0.90***	0.92***	0.92***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj. R-sq	0.75	0.76	0.82	0.81
N	699	673	520	505

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations correspond to a village in a particular election cycle. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the *Pradhan* is female. "All" includes all villages in the dataset. Columns (2)-(4) include election cycles as of 1993 when reservations for women were implemented. "All-NR" excludes villages from states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and villages from the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

Table A.4. Impact of father's death post-reservations on *Pradhan's* gender at father's death

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All-NR	(6) All-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.45	0.45
N	12457	12285	12285	12285	10086	10006

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the *Pradhan* is female at the time of father's death. "All" includes all individuals in the dataset. Columns (2)-(6) include individuals whose father died as of 1993 when reservations for women were implemented. "All-NR" excludes individuals from states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and individuals from the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

Table A.5. Women's Reservations' Timing, Selection, & Rotation, by Indian State

State	Panchayat Act (Year)	First Election	Random	Selection Method	Rotation	Increase to 50% Quota
Andhra Pradesh	1994	1995	Not Random	Sex ratio	Unknown	2011
Bihar	1993	2006	As-if Random	Population Size	Without replacement, every 10 years	2006
Delhi	1993	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	No
Chhattisgarh	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2008
Gujarat	1994	1995	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	No
Haryana	1994	1994	Random	Draw of lots	Unknown	No
Himachal Pradesh	1994	1995	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	Without replacement, every 5 years	2010
Jharkhand	2001	2010	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	2005
Karnataka	1993	1993	As-if Random	Population size: panchayat seats	No two consecutive reservations	No
Kerala	1994	1995	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	No two consecutive reservations	No
Madhya Pradesh	1994	1994	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	Yes, n.d.
Maharashtra	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2011
Orissa	1994	1997	Random	Alphabetical order (every 3rd)	Without replacement, every 5 years	2011
Punjab	1994	1998	Unknown	Unknown	Every 10 years	No
Rajasthan	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2008
Tamil Nadu	1994	1996	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	Without replacement, every 10 years	2016
Uttar Pradesh	1994	1995	As-if Random	Population size	No two consecutive reservations	No
West Bengal	1994	1998	Random	Legislative Assembly numbers (every 3rd, ascending)	Without replacement, random number table	2012

Main Sources: Panchayat Raj Acts, Election Rules, & Department of Rural Development & Panchayat Raj. See following note for details.

Note: Coding Procedure for Table A.5: Women's Reservations

To compile this table, I consulted each state's *Panchayati Raj* Act, *Panchayat* Election Rules, Department of Rural Development and *Panchayat Raj*, according to document availability. I also utilize invaluable secondary analysis by Mishra (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Paul (2006), Nilekani (2010), Ghosh et al. (2011), and Shankar (2016). Three facets of the data presented in this table are worth noting.

First, variation in the timing of State Panchayat Act's passage, from 1993 to 2001, and the subsequent timing of each state's first Panchayat elections, which start in 1994 and end in 2010. While most states implemented initial elections and reservations within two years of constitutional amendments' passage, two states took more than five years to implement the amendments. In Bihar, the fourteen year gap between the Panchayat Act's passage in 1993 and elections in 2006 is due to legal challenges. For Jharkhand, state reorganization explains the nine-year gap between the Panchayat Act's ratification in 2001 and the first round of elections in 2010.

Second, states had discretion over how to implement reservations' rotation. Nearly half of states with available documentation (6 of 14) randomly select female *pradhans* via draw of lots or in alphabetic (panchayat) or numeric (legislative assemblies' arbitrary numeric code) order. Another quarter (4) utilize as-if random methods to assign reservations, mainly based on population size to determine reservation status. Thus, most states select *pradhan's* reservation status using a random or as-if random mechanism. The remaining quarter of states use a potentially non-random selection mechanism: the proportion of women in the population. If the proportion of women in a village's population is an indicator of pre-existing norms about women's value, this selection criteria could bias the sample of villages receiving reservations earlier to the subset with norms that particularly value women. This might be true if villages with norms promoting women are less likely to contain households that limit female births via the illegal but widespread practice of sex selection. This suggests two methods of identifying appropriate samples for analysis: first, excluding states with non-

random selection of reservation status, and second, excluding both states with non-random selection mechanisms and late-implementing states. Both methods lead to highly comparable "control" villages, where women's reservations have yet to be implemented, and "treatment" villages where women's reservations have already been implemented.

Third and finally, rotation of women's reservations mainly occurs every five-year electoral cycle. Three exceptions exist: the Indian states of Bihar, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. Two of these exceptions—Bihar and Tamil Nadu—are already excluded from tests that study states that are timely-implementers using as-if random selection mechanisms only. As a result, variation in reservations' rotation period is unlikely to introduce bias into analysis. However, the impact of reservations' varied rotation mechanisms is a worthy topic for future research.

Table A.6. Descriptive Statistics, Individuals

	All	Women	Men
Subject to Hindu law (Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist)	0.92	0.92	0.92
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Inherit land?	0.13	0.04	0.24
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.43)
Total land inherited	0.43	0.14	0.74
	(1.85)	(1.18)	(2.33)
Age (years)	30.65	30.79	30.51
	(12.78)	(12.36)	(13.21)
Education (years completed)	6.43	5.50	7.29
	(4.51)	(4.36)	(4.47)
Siblings: proportion of sisters	0.38	0.41	0.35
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Father: secondary or more education	0.36	0.37	0.36
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Mother: secondary or more education	0.13	0.13	0.13
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Parents = top 20% landholders (15acres+)	0.21	0.21	0.21
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Patriarch's land (acres)	6.75	6.88	6.62
	(16.43)	(17.78)	(14.86)
Scheduled Caste	0.18	0.18	0.19
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Scheduled Tribe	0.10	0.10	0.10
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Other Backward Caste	0.26	0.25	0.27
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Muslim	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Total number of children (household head)	3.87	3.95	3.79
	(2.03)	(2.05)	(2.00)
Western states (Gujarat, Maharashtra)	0.13	0.12	0.13
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Wealthy: Head's parents own 8 acres or more	0.25	0.26	0.25
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Patriarch: number of daughters	2.08	2.22	1.92
	(1.51)	(1.55)	(1.45)
Patriarch: number of sons	3.04	2.91	3.18
	(1.50)	(1.46)	(1.52)
Observations	61569	31729	29840

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes men and women born post-Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA in their states. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A.7. Descriptive Statistics, Main Dependent and Independent Variables

	All	Women	Men
Aged <20 at reform	0.38	0.37	0.39
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Pradhan seat ever reserved for a woman	0.69	0.69	0.69
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Latest pradhan seat reserved for a woman	0.33	0.33	0.33
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Father died post reservations	0.42	0.48	0.34
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.47)
Father died post reform	0.31	0.41	0.20
	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.40)
Father died post reform & reservations	0.36	0.44	0.25
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.43)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.12	0.15	0.10
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.30)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	0.14	0.15	0.14
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	0.14	0.15	0.13
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Inherit land?	0.13	0.04	0.24
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.43)
Area of inherited plot fragment	3.46	3.57	3.45
	(5.10)	(7.93)	(4.76)
Any dowry given (for a woman)	0.34	0.48	−−
	(0.48)	(0.50)	−−
Last gram sabha: attended? (%)	0.23	0.10	0.34
	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.47)
Current pradhan: how able to resolve social problems (scale of 1-3)?	1.96	1.95	1.97
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.74)
Observations	61569	31729	29840

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes all men and women born post-Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA in their state. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A.8. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, excluding non-random implementers

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	294652.41	299450.78	299793.30	342.52
				(0.01)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.53	0.46	−0.07
				(−1.91)
Village population: first panchayat period	4096.88	3999.12	4383.50	384.38
				(0.49)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	12.56	12.58	12.49	−0.09
				(−0.12)
% SCs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.22	0.23	0.20	−0.03
				(−0.94)
% STs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.11	0.12	0.11	−0.00
				(−0.07)
% OBCs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.41	0.30	−0.10
				(−2.03)
% Hindus in village population currently	0.87	0.88	0.86	−0.02
				(−0.44)
% Muslims in village population currently	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.01
				(0.51)
% SCs in village population currently	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−0.74)
% STs in village population currently	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.05
				(1.35)
% OBCs in village population currently	0.09	0.08	0.12	0.04
				(1.09)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population currently	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.02
				(0.61)
% own land in village population currently	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.01
				(0.22)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	87992.70	98526.88	68153.85	−30373.04
				(−1.34)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	417477.12	419767.86	447702.70	27934.85
				(0.31)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.19	0.18	0.25	0.08
				(1.13)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.14	0.11	0.24	0.12
				(1.83)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.14	0.15	0.12	−0.03
				(−0.50)
Number of villages	189	131	51	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.9. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, excluding non-random and late implementers

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	301560.08	299316.64	304971.68	5655.04
				(0.18)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.52	0.54	0.47	−0.07
				(−1.66)
Village population: first panchayat period	4096.88	3999.12	4383.50	384.38
				(0.47)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	12.56	12.58	12.49	−0.09
				(−0.12)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.22	0.23	0.20	−0.03
				(−0.91)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.11	0.12	0.11	−0.00
				(−0.07)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.41	0.30	−0.10
				(−1.98)
% Hindus in village population now	0.88	0.88	0.87	−0.01
				(−0.35)
% Muslims in village population now	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.01
				(0.29)
% SCs in village population now	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−0.58)
% STs in village population now	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.05
				(1.68)
% OBCs in village population now	0.09	0.08	0.13	0.05
				(1.38)
% own <2 acres of land in village population now	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.02
				(0.68)
% own land in village population now	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.01
				(0.39)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	89574.80	98769.23	66333.33	−32435.90
				(−0.92)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	418604.17	416036.36	426911.76	10875.40
				(0.09)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.20	0.18	0.27	0.09
				(1.36)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.14	0.10	0.23	0.13
				(2.24)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.14	0.14	0.12	−0.01
				(−0.25)
Number of villages	179	129	48	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.10. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, matched sample

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	280589.91	275056.09	285668.90	10612.81
				(0.32)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.54	0.48	−0.06
				(−1.87)
Village population: first panchayat period	5054.18	5036.24	5075.17	38.93
				(0.03)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	11.69	11.83	11.54	−0.28
				(−0.38)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.21	0.22	0.18	−0.04
				(−1.20)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.02
				(0.64)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.43	0.31	−0.12
				(−1.99)
% Hindus in village population now	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.03
				(0.68)
% Muslims in village population now	0.07	0.07	0.07	−0.01
				(−0.28)
% SCs in village population now	0.05	0.06	0.04	−0.02
				(−0.97)
% STs in village population now	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.04
				(1.10)
% OBCs in village population now	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.06
				(1.81)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population now	0.26	0.28	0.24	−0.04
				(−1.39)
% own land in village population now	0.47	0.48	0.45	−0.04
				(−0.86)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	104944.44	117780.00	93879.31	−23900.69
				(−1.09)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	386398.23	365964.91	407196.43	41231.52
				(0.54)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.20	0.18	0.22	0.04
				(0.59)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.15	0.12	0.18	0.06
				(0.97)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.15	0.16	0.14	−0.03
				(−0.45)
Number of villages	140	67	73	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table includes genetically matched villages only, where genetic matching follows Sekhon and Titiunik (2012). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays beta coefficients, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.11. Descriptive Statistics: Women's Mean Probability of Land Inheritance Conditional on Village Rate of Women's *Gram Sabha* Participation, Currently-Reserved Villages

	(1) Individual Observations Mean Pr(Inherit)	(2) Village Observations Mean Pr(Inherit)
Above Average Participation	0.047	0.050
Average - Below Average Participation	0.028	0.026
Total (in currently-reserved villages)	0.030	0.029
Observations	16147	71

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. Village-level means are calculated by assessing all women's participation in the most recent *Gram Sabha* conducted in each village currently reserved for a female *Pradhan.* Women's 'average' participation at the village level is calculated slightly differently for each specification. Column 1 calculates the average of all village-level averages using the entire population of women in REDS 2006/9 sample of currently reserved villages. Here, 9.7 percent of women participated in the latest *Gram Sabha* meeting, on average. Column 2 collapses observations by villages, such that women's 'average' participation is calculated over the total number of villages currently reserved for a female *Pradhan.* Using this method, 11.1 percent of women participated in the most recent *Gram Sabha* meeting, on average. The correlation of "above average" participation with women's inheritance is positive in both cases: 0.1097 for individual-level observations (Column 1) and 0.1637 for village-level observations (Column 2).

Table A.12. Reform's Short & Long-term Impact on Women's Land Inheritance, Replication of Goyal et al. (2013)

	(1) Hindu	(2) Hindu	(3) Non Hindu	(4) Non Hindu
Female	-0.52**	-0.46***	0.18	-0.63*
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Female * father dies post-HSAA	0.09*		0.04	
	(0.04)		(0.14)	
Female * father's death pre-1-6 years of reform		-0.04		0.04
		(0.05)		(0.22)
Female * death post-0-5 years reform		0.04		-0.15
		(0.06)		(0.21)
Female * death post-6+ years reform		0.09*		0.14
		(0.04)		(0.16)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-sq	0.58	0.59	0.71	0.72
N	10794	10852	608	618

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent inherits land. The sample includes only the household head and his or her siblings and is restricted to residents of four early reformer states: Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. The direction of coefficients displayed corresponds to those with significance in Columns 1,2, and 5 (restructured to be comparable to Columns 1-2) of Table 2 in Goyal et al. (2013: 128-9). I replicate Goyal and her co-authors' use of fixed effects for household, year of birth, and gender-specific year of birth, and include state fixed effects for congruence with my main analysis. Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey 2006/9.

Table A.13. Reform's Impact on Inheritance, Replication of Roy (2015)

	(1) Inherit land?	(2) Inherit land?	(3) Inherit land?	(4) Inherit land?	(5) Inherit land?	(6) Inherit land?	(7) Inherit land?	(8) Inherit land?
Aged 1-10 at reform	0.06	0.06^{+}	0.11^{+}	0.10^{+}	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Aged 11-15 at reform	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Aged 16-20 at reform	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Grandfather died post reform	0.14*	0.14*	0.20*	0.21*				
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)				
Aged 1-10 at reform * Grandfather died post reform	-0.16*	-0.16*	-0.21^{+}	-0.21^{+}				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)				
Aged 11-15 at reform* Grandfather died post reform	-0.08	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11				
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)				
Aged 16-20 at reform* Grandfather died post reform	-0.06	-0.05	-0.15^{+}	-0.14^{+}				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)				
Father died post reform					0.06	0.06	0.08	0.09
					(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged 1-10 at reform * Father died post reform					-0.05	-0.07	-0.10	-0.16
					(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Aged 11-15 at reform* Father died post reform					-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00
					(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Aged 16-20 at reform* Father died post reform					-0.12*	-0.11**	-0.07^{+}	-0.09*
					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Father's year of death FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Grandfather's year of death FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Adj. R-sq	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.11	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.12
N	1006	1006	954	954	3142	3142	2685	2685

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent inherits land. This dataset uses the NCAER's REDS 2006/9 round. Following Roy (2015), the sample includes only women from early reformer states: Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra. Controls include caste status, the total number of children in a family, and a binary indicator for wealth status, which approximates the continuous variable that Roy uses to measure household income. The significance and direction of the coefficients on either father's or grandfather's death post-reform, as relevant, corresponds to those reported in Appendix Table A2, Columns 3-6 of Roy (2015: 245). There are two sources of difference between Roy (2015)'s results and the replication I am able to construct. First, while we both identify a negative impact of reform for the 16-20 age group, this is not significant in Roy's analysis. The second is the number of observations. Roy assembles a dataset of roughly twice the size compared to what I can construct using REDS 2006/9 round: ranging from 2128-2228 observations for specifications using grandfather's death to 4313-5054 when using father's death. I am only able to identify 957-1012 observations for specifications using the grandfather's year of death, and 2686-3143 for specifications using the father's year of death.

Table A.14. Reservation's Impact on Women's Inheritance, Excluding Sisters without Brothers

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late	(5) Target	(6) Target	(7) Target-NR	(8) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.06^{+}	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.06	0.06*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform	0.07*	0.07*	0.08*	0.08*	0.10*	0.10*	0.11*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.14**	-0.14***	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.21**	-0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform					0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform					-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06
					(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations					-0.07	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.10*
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations					0.19**	0.23***	0.23**	0.23**
					(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
N	5503	5503	4931	4727	5503	5503	4931	4727

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. The sample is limited to women with male siblings. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families who were born post 1956 Hindu Succession Act, but prior to their state-specific HSAA's passage. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.15. Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance; Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.51^{+}	0.48^{+}	0.47	0.68^{*}	0.70^{*}	0.71^{*}
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Father died post reform	-0.62^{**}	0.24	-0.01	0.36	0.45^{+}	0.49^{+}
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Father died post reform & reservations	-1.70^{***}	-1.34^{***}	-1.32^{*}	-1.49^{***}	-1.55^{***}	-1.59^{***}
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.64)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21
Observations	15197	15197	8453	9993	8932	8575

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA).""Matched" refers to the subsample of genetically matched women. "Target" in columns (4)-(6) includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.16. Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance, OLS

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched
Father died post reservations	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Father died post reform	-0.04***	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & post reservations	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05
N	17737	17737	9672

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. For the genetically matched sample, the direction of coefficients is consistent with the main results in Table 1, although the standard errors increase, likely due to the halving of the sample in the matching process. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.17. Placebo test: Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target - NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Father died post 1984	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.21^{+}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & 1984	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.22^{+}	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(.)	(.)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08
N	17727	17727	9662	11818	10693	10254

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. Rather than including a binary indicator of father's death post-reservations, these specifications include an indicator of whether or not a father dies in or after 1984, ten years before the introduction of women's reservations. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.18. Reservation's impact on Women's Area of Inheritance (acres)

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.06	0.08^{+}	0.09^{*}	0.09^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Father died post reform	-0.08	-0.09	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
N	11826	11826	10698	10259

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the land area that women inherit, in acres. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.19. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance, Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	−0.33	−0.25	−0.32	0.13	−0.00	−0.05
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.62)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Father died post reservations	0.51^{+}	0.49^{+}	0.49	0.69^{*}	0.70^{*}	0.70^{*}
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Father died post reform	-0.64^{**}	0.24	0.01	0.35	0.43	0.47^{+}
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Father died post reform & post reservations	-1.67^{***}	-1.34^{***}	-1.34^{*}	-1.47^{***}	-1.53^{***}	-1.56^{***}
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.65)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.20	0.05	−0.20	−0.04	0.25	0.24
	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.67)	(0.51)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	-10.71^{***}	-11.06^{***}	-12.03^{***}	-7.96^{***}	-7.82^{***}	-9.32^{***}
	(1.65)	(1.50)	(2.27)	(1.90)	(1.91)	(1.92)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	10.53^{***}	11.04^{***}	12.03^{***}	7.78^{***}	7.65^{***}	9.14^{***}
	(1.80)	(1.63)	(2.41)	(1.95)	(1.95)	(1.97)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21
Observations	15197	15197	8453	9993	8932	8575

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subsample. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female *Pradhans* randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. In the full specification with controls (Column 2), the double interaction for "Aged <20 at reform" and "Father died post reservations" has standard errors which vary by 0.0005 across rounds of regressions, ranging from 1.4948 to 1.4953, when estimating these results to four decimal places. This does not alter the term's statistical significance. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.20. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance and Dowry

	(1) Inherit All	(2) Inherit All	(3) Inherit Matched	(4) Dowry All	(5) Dowry All	(6) Dowry Matched
Aged <20 at reform	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reservations	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04^{+}	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.66***	-0.17***	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & post reservations	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06	-0.12***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.10*	0.04^{+}	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	-0.08*	-0.09**	-0.09^{+}	0.27***	0.08*	0.07^{+}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	0.09*	0.11**	0.11^{+}	-0.32***	-0.12***	-0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.53	0.78	0.79
N	17737	17737	9672	17737	17737	9672

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(3) is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. In Columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women receive dowry from their natal families. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.21. Placebo test: Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Father died in 1984	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.20^{+}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & 1984	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	-0.21^{+}	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(.)	(.)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(.)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(.)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post 1984	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & 1984	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(.)	(.)	(0.05)	(.)	(.)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08
N	17727	17727	9662	11818	10693	10254

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. Rather than including a binary indicator of father's death post-reservations, these specifications include an indicator of whether or not a father dies in or after 1984, ten years before the introduction of women's reservations. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. "Target" includes only landed, Hindu women born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.22. Reservation's Impact: Attendance and Pradhan Effectiveness, OLS, Matched Samples

	(1) Attendance Matched	(2) Effectiveness Matched
Female	-0.21***	-0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latest Pradhan seat reserved for woman	-0.25***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female * Reservations	0.12**	0.04+
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Village FE	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.47	0.27
N	13399	12703

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women attended the latest *Gram Sabha* in Column (1). In Column (2) the dependent variable is a 3-tier scale representing respondents' evaluation of the *Pradhan's* "Ability to solve social problems, such as disputes over land, marriage, etc." Ranking varies from "high" (3), to "medium" (2) or "low" (1). For both specifications the sample includes the subset of adult (aged 18 years or more) women residing in surveyed households within genetically matched villages. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.23. Reservation's Impact on Women's Participation in *Gram Sabha*, Logit model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) All-NR	(5) All-NR-late
Female	-2.90***	-2.11***	-2.16***	-2.08***	-2.06***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Latest pradhan seat reserved for woman	-1.52***	-1.75***	-1.45***	0.34***	0.34***
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Female * Reservations	0.26	0.30	0.34	0.12	0.14
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.47
N	22235	22235	12710	17446	17074

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women attended the latest *gram sabha*. "All" includes all adult (aged 18 years or more) women residing in surveyed households. "All-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). "Matched" refers to the subsample of genetically matched individuals. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.24. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Dowry, Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	0.37	0.39	0.21	0.71	2.29**	2.23**
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.64)	(0.76)	(0.78)
Father died post reservations	0.23	0.12	-0.12	-0.02	-0.22	-0.20
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Father died post reform	-3.73***	-1.49***	-1.32***	-1.66***	-1.76***	-1.77***
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.78**	-0.08	-0.24	0.27	0.43	0.44
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.04	0.53	0.84+	0.48	-1.57*	-1.61*
	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.77)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	13.20***	12.83***	10.52***	12.21***	11.53***	11.75***
	(0.52)	(0.72)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.89)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	-13.93***	-13.98***	-11.50***	-13.20***	-11.93***	-12.17***
	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.84)	(0.96)	(0.89)	(0.91)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.444	0.744	0.759	0.739	0.760	0.761
N	16446	16446	9092	10768	9670	9288

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women receive dowry from their families. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" refers to the genetically matched subsample. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. In the full specification without controls (Column 1), the double interaction for "Aged <20 at reform" and "Father died post reservations" has standard errors which vary by 0.01 across 500 rounds of regressions, ranging from 0.51 to 0.52 when estimating this specification to two decimal places. This variation does not alter the term's statistical significance. When estimating this specification to four decimal places, the standard errors consistently round to 0.52. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

A.1 Online Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Qualitative Interview Districts, Andhra Pradesh State

Census of India, 2001 political boundaries. Limited interviews also occurred in Hyderabad and in Warangal District, North West of Khammam. Following the 2014 Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, the state was bifrucated into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana States. Khammam, Ranga Reddy (Rangareddi) and Warangal are now located in Telangana, while the remainder of my interview districts remain in Andhra Pradesh.

Figure A.2. Village-level Distribution of Reservations for Female Pradhans



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.3. Indian States by Implementation Date of Women's Reservations



Sources: State Panchayat Raj Acts and Election Rules, Departments of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj (summarized in Appendix Table A.5), and NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.4. Indian States by Proportion of Individuals in Ever Reserved Villages



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.5. Reservations' Impact on Women's Land Inheritance (acres)



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes Hindu women from landholding families who were born pre-reform in their respective states and post-1956 HSA. Those women are excluded whose fathers reside in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Each point on the graph represents the average area (in acres) of land inherited in a certain acquisition year for individuals whose land acquisition year is known.

Figure A.6. Comparison of Net Effects for Table 1: Reservations' Impact on Daughters' Inheritance



a) Women entering marriage markets at reform.

b) Women exiting marriage markets at reform.

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes women born into Hindu, landholding families after the 1956 HSA, but before state-specific HSAA. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). For Figure A.6a, the net effect of reform pre-reservations is calculated using the following formula: $\delta' + \theta''$, the net effect of reform post-reservations is calculated by $\delta' + \delta''' + \theta'' + \delta''''$, their difference is given by $\delta''' + \delta''''$ from Equation 2. For Figure A.6b, the net effect of reform pre-reservations is given by δ', the net effect of reform post-reservations is $\delta' + \delta'''$.

Figure A.7. Cumulative Distribution of Marriage Age for Women



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This graph includes all women in the sample. The x-axis represents marriage age. The y-axis represents the cumulative probability of a woman marrying at a given age. Each point on the graph represents the cumulative probability of marriage at a certain age.

Figure A.8. Density Plots for the Percentage of Women in Sub-district Population



Figure A.9. Coding Strategy: Treatment by Women's Reservations and Eligibility for Gender-Equal Inheritance Rights



*A woman receives gender equal inheritance rights if she is eligible under both conditions (a) and (b).
** A woman is able to effectively transfer formal land inheritance rights where reservations for female heads of local government (*pradhans)* have been in place before/at the time of the patriarch's death.
[1] States amended the Hindu Succession Act in varied years, beginning with Kerala in 1976, followed by Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994. As of 2005, a national amendment applied reform to all states, making all Indian citizens subject to Hindu Law (Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs) with fathers who die post 2005 without wills eligible for gender equal inheritance rights.

Note to Figure A.9: Application of Hindu Succession Amendment Act

Inheritance or 'succession' is an item which forms a part of the 'Concurrent List' (i.e. List-III (Seventh Schedule)) of the Indian constitution, thereby granting both states and the central government the right to legislate on it. In addition, inheritance is subject to "personal law," dictated by the faith of each citizen. Here, I focus on "Hindu" personal law, which applies to Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Parsees as well as Hindus.

One of Independent India's first legislative acts was to pass the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (hereafter the 'HSA'). This reform provided unbalanced inheritance rights to daughters as compared with sons. Each daughter whose father died after reform's passage received a notional share of her father's land, equal to a portion of the share that a son inherits upon his Hindu father's death intestate. Sons became members of the *coparcenary* upon birth and received their own independent share of ancestral property. At that time, *the coparcenary* included three generations of *all-male* descendants, each of whom received a direct right upon birth to an independent share of the joint family property. Upon the death of his father, a son received his (indirect) share of the father's property alongside his own independent (or direct) share. Additionally, sons could demand partition of the joint family property while daughters could not. In contrast, a daughter's share was generally small enough to be purely symbolic, as it was derived exclusively from her *father's* share in the joint family property, as separate from each other Hindu male coparcener's independent share. Unlike sons, daughters never received an independent (or direct) share of the joint family property *upon birth,* as did their brothers, or at any point later in life. Roy (2016) notes that a daughter's "notional" portion (or indirect share) of her father's piece of the joint family property was determined on a per capita basis, calculated according to the hypothetical partitioning of a given Hindu Joint Family property, as if partition had taken place just before paternal death.

To provide a more concrete example, Chowdhry (2009) explains the relative gender imbalance of inheritance shares in a minimal family arrangement, which is the most generous to daughters. She considers a family comprised of three members: a father, a son and a daugh-

ter. Following the father's death post HSA, the son inherits a three-fourth share—including one half by "virtue of right by birth" i.e., his direct share as a member of the coparcenary and "one-fourth by succession under the Act—while the daughter gets only one-fourth", that is an indirect share (Chowdhry 2009, xvii). In addition, for daughters, inheritance granted them quite circumscribed access to a *limited estate,* which meant that while they could enjoy profits from the family property during their lives, they were not allowed to alienate (sell) their share, unlike brothers.

Following state-level amendments of the Hindu Succession Act, eligible daughters gained a share of her joint family property which was exactly equivalent to that of sons in the same family. Different states amended the Hindu Succession Act in different years. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra each enacted inheritance reform between the years of 1976 and 1994 (1976, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1994, respectively). Thereafter, in 2005, the national government enacted legislation which would be applicable in all Indian states. The text of reform is nearly identical across states. The major exception is Kerala, which abolished the Hindu Joint Family as an entity rather than amending the Hindu Succession Act, but still shares the HSAA's goal of establishing gender-equal inheritance rights. The primary change legislated by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act (HSAA) was to deem daughters members of the *coparcenary*, each of whom are each entitled to an independent share in the Hindu Joint Family property upon birth. The HSAA also made women's agency equivalent to that of men, enabling daughters to alienate their share, demand partition of Hindu Joint Family property, and to become the *karta* (manager) of the joint family property.

Figure A.10. Comparisons of Coefficient Sizes for Table 1: Women's Probability of Inheritance



a) Columns 1-4 b) Columns 5-8

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.11. Net Effects for Table 1: Women's Probability of Inheritance



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes Hindu women born into landholding families after the 1956 Hindu Sucession Act, but before state-specific HSAA reforms. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Net effects are based on Table 1, Column 3. The effect of reservations post-reform is calculated by $\delta' + \delta'''$, the effect of reform post-reservations is given by $\delta'' + \delta'''$. The total effect of reform and reservations is calculated by using the following formula: $\delta'' + \delta' + \delta'''$ in Equation 1.

Figure A.12. Comparisons of Coefficient Sizes: Reservations' Impact on Daughters' Likelihood of Receiving Dowry



a) Women entering marriage markets at reform.

b) Women exiting marriage markets at reform.

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes women born into Hindu, landholding families after the 1956 HSA, but before the state-specific HSAA. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Net effects are based on Table 3's OLS regression estimates. For Figure A.12a, the net effect of reservations pre-reform is calculated using the following formula: $\delta'' + \theta'''$, the net effect of reservations post-reform is calculated by $\delta'' + \delta''' + \theta''' + \delta''''$, their difference is given by $\delta''' + \delta''''$ from Equation 2. For Figure A.12b, the net effect of reservations pre-reform is given by δ'', the net effect of reservations post-reform is $\delta'' + \delta'''$.