Reform, Representation & Resistance
The Politics of Property Rights' Enforcement

Rachel E. Brulé *

September 16, 2018
Accepted, *Journal of Politics*

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi. Email: reb11@nyu.edu

Abstract

When do quotas for women's political representation promote economic gender equality? Legislative reforms equalizing economic rights are common globally, with mixed results. I consider the impact of quotas on women's rights in a crucial domain: property. I leverage exogenously set electoral quotas—reservations—for women as heads of local government in India. Reservations enable clean identification of the impact of representation on enforcing gender-equalizing land inheritance reforms. I find that political representation enables women to secure property rights and ensure that they are upheld. However, backlash occurs when reservations guaranteeing female representation make enforcement of reform credible. Women can reduce this backlash by utilizing female representation to trade traditional monetary dowry for property inheritance and familial responsibilities. This, in turn, reduces the "cost" of reform to men. These findings confirm the power of political representation to not only claim economic rights but broaden their acceptance by changing perceptions of parity.

Short title: Reform, Representation & Resistance

Keywords: *electoral gender quotas, representation, property rights, backlash, political economy of reform*

Supplementary material for this article is available in Appendix A in the online edition.
Replication files are available in the *JOP* Data Archive on Dataverse (`http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop`).
Studies were conducted in compliance with relevant laws and approved by Stanford University IRB Protocol 18558 and NYU Abu Dhabi IRB Protocol 114-2016.
Support for this research was provided by India's National Council of Applied Economic Research, Canada's International Development Research Center, the Truman Foundation, and the Stanford University Center for the Study of South Asia.

When do quotas for female political representation advance women's economic prerogatives? This question, fundamental to debates about democratic institutions' ability to further social and economic equality, remains contested (Bush 2011; O'Brien and Rickne 2016). A broad body of literature contends that female political representatives boost women's ability to voice policy preferences and demand political rights.[1] Yet, a competing body of research finds evidence of backlash against female representation which in turn diminishes women's political engagement (Clayton 2015) and increases discrimination and violence against women (Mayaram 2002).

I contribute to this debate by considering the impact of political representation on enforcement of women's rights in a crucial economic domain: property. State-secured property rights are widely agreed to be crucial for reducing poverty and promoting growth (North and Thomas 1973; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Herring 1983; De Soto 2000). However, they are notoriously difficult to enforce, particularly for socially marginalized groups (Albertus 2015; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). I argue that quotas mandating women's political representation can increase enforcement of their property rights by changing the gender of pivotal local officials: "gatekeepers." Male gatekeepers typically lack incentives to shift property rights from traditional, male holders to females. Female gatekeepers may increase women's capacity to demand property rights and secure their enforcement. Yet quotas can be a double-edged sword. Female representation can spark resistance when quotas occur alongside legislative reforms that materially reduce men's long-standing property rights.

I test this "gatekeeper" theory within one institutional context—India, the world's largest democracy. This enables an effective causal identification. I exploit exogenously applied electoral quotas for women in local government, known as "reservations" and mandated as of 1993. I examine the impact of these reservations on landmark reforms that granted Hindu

[1]See, for example: Mansbridge (1999); Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001); Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Bhavnani (2009); Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2010); Reingold and Harrell (2010); Iyer, Mani, Mishra, and Topalova (2012); Chauchard (2014).

women equal rights to inherit ancestral property. These reforms, amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (hereafter the HSAA or "reforms"), were enacted state-by-state, beginning in 1976 and culminating in a national legislative mandate in 2005. They equalized the rights upon birth of roughly four hundred million daughters to inherit a share of joint family property (Agarwal 1994). They are significant because the majority of land in rural India remains jointly owned, and because pre-reform, sons were the only children entitled by birth to inherit independent shares in jointly owned property (Desai 2010).[2] Existing work provides mixed evidence of property rights reforms' effectiveness in India: while Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan (2013) find supportive evidence, Roy (2015) shows that reform failed to increase the likelihood of property inheritance by women. This suggests that the impact of reform is at best heterogeneous, with reasons for its variance poorly understood.

For my analysis, I use panel survey data for over 8,500 households collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in the 2006/2009 round of the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS). I also compile what is to my knowledge the most comprehensive summary of reservations' timing, selection and rotation mechanisms (Appendix Table A.5). In addition, I draw on new qualitative evidence to uncover mechanisms through which gatekeepers influence the impact of gender-equalizing property inheritance reforms. Original data includes interviews with landholders, politicians, bureaucrats, lawyers and social activists across eight districts in a state which pioneered property rights reforms: Andhra Pradesh. Over several years of field research I conducted focus group discussions in 48 villages (Figure A.1). To broaden the scope of my argument, I also interviewed a number of influential lawyers, bureaucrats and politicians across North India.

I find that quotas for female, elected heads of local government enable women to wield political authority to secure property rights while bringing to power a class of individuals who are willing and able to ensure these rights are subsequently upheld. As a result, women

[2]Roy (2015) calculates 84% of household property to be ancestral using REDS's 1999 round; Sircar and Pal (2014) estimate 73% of plots households own or access are inherited.

are more likely to inherit land, and those who do inherit larger plots. I identify public and private channels through which quotas function: increasing women's political participation and female representatives' success at mediating private disputes over land and marriage.

However, once gender-equal inheritance rights become law, backlash occurs where quotas for females in positions of power render enforcement of reform real and credible. To explore alternative economic distributions which might mitigate or offset this adverse effect, I consider whether women's ability to renegotiate traditional resource entitlements, including both property inheritance and dowry—monetary transfers to a groom's family—can alter resistance. Although dowries are illegal, they are widely accepted and employed as substitutes for property inheritance. Once a dowry is paid, it is assumed a woman has received her fair share of her natal family's resources. Yet if women can turn to female representatives for help at the time of marriage negotiations, I find they are less likely to accept a dowry, preferring to wait for the deferred entitlement of property inheritance. These women are able to strike agreements with parents and brothers which benefit everyone in terms of financial conservation and other mutually-advantageous exchanges. Indeed, I find evidence of lower dowry and higher inheritance amongst women who enter marriage markets with equal inheritance rights and access to female representatives.

This study contributes to resolving the debate over whether and when changing political and economic rights are sufficient to alter patterns of exclusion. Optimistic scholars in political economy and law contend that strategically-designed legal reform significantly impacts social, economic, and political incentives for cooperation (Becker 1981; Posner 2000). If they are correct, property rights reforms should uniformly improve beneficiaries' welfare, for example as Deininger et al. (2013) find. In contrast, skeptics argue that legal reform alone is insufficient to change behavior, highlighting the role of political institutions in driving effective reform (North and Weingast 1989; Dasgupta, Gawande, and Kapur 2017). Widespread evidence of the ineffectiveness of property reform alone suggests we require a theory to predict when political representation can make property rights reforms stick (Besley and Burgess

2002; Ban and Rao 2008). Popular opinion holds that enforcement is difficult and uneven, particularly in the face of widespread resistance. However, the nature of this resistance is rarely studied directly or in depth. I show that where support from political institutions is present, egalitarian property rights are more likely to be enforced. This, in turn mobilizes resistance when enforcement is costly to those most directly impacted.

This analysis is relevant not only to India but also across 100-plus nations currently implementing quotas to benefit women and other marginalized groups through political representation and social integration (Bush 2011; Fox and Lawless 2014; Clayton 2015). My research suggests that mandating descriptive representation promotes enforcement of economic property rights for the represented groups. However, where conflicting social norms exist, representation may also catalyze resistance to economic empowerment. Thus, state-sponsored reforms advancing social equality ignore contrary social norms at their own peril (Fouka 2016; Anderson and Genicot 2015).

Yet, where changes in economic rights are introduced at moments when changes in social organization are being negotiated—such as around the time of marriage—female representation may enable women to renegotiate integral norms—dowry in India—to redistribute entitlements more equitably. In sum, political representation can be a powerful tool when represented groups have leverage to strike bargains across multiple domains that make economic equality beneficial to all.

Reform and Indian Political Institutions

One line of research finds providing greater descriptive representation for women increases female citizens' political engagement.[3] In India, a number of studies yield evidence of women's greater participation in local politics following village-level adoption of reservations for fe-

[3]Globally: Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007); Norris and Krook (2009); Barnes and Burchard (2013); in America: Atkeson and Carrillo (2007); Burns et al. (2001).

male heads of government.[4] If so, the state's capacity to hear and respond to women's policy interests and demands should be substantially enlarged in the presence of female political representation.

However, a second line of research finds that increasing women's descriptive political representation without simultaneous changes in other institutional constraints may at best create 'token' representatives who prove unable to exert influence independent of male representatives (Mansbridge 1983; Lawless 2004; Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Goedert 2014). In India, a widespread view is that elected women's spouses wield the real political power. There is even a title for such men: *Sarpanchpati* or *Pradhanpati,* literally *spouse of the female council head* (Buch 2010). This belief remains prevalent despite the ubiquitous presence of an unofficial political 'godfather' who helps all new entrants navigate political power (John 2007, 3988). Overall, political reform that ignores the social implications of female economic advancement may mobilize resistance against those who reform aims to empower (Mayaram 2002). Indeed, growing global evidence suggests that backlash may explicitly be tied to increased visibility of those representing vulnerable groups, the strength of their motivation, and their subsequent effectiveness (Okimoto and Brescoll 2010; Clayton 2015; Fouka 2016).

This raises a related question: does the state's responsibility in promoting greater social and economic parity extend beyond passing progressive legislation? Optimists contend that legislation is sufficient to alter social norms, making enforcement self-actuating by reweighting individual bargaining power (Posner 2000; Sachs 2005; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Pessimists caution that those who historically and traditionally benefit from the *status quo* are unlikely to acquiesce to laws challenging their control over resources *unless* the government applies enforcement sufficient to constrain their behavior (North and Weingast 1989). Indeed, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that social norms provide many of the most important, enduring incentives which shape political behavior.

[4]See, in particular: Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Bhavnani (2009); Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2009); Beaman et al. (2010).

In India, much debate has focused on one institutional shift to increase descriptive representation: quotas that change the identity of elected local government heads. Since 1993—when the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian constitution were adopted—a three-tiered system of local governance with 'reservations' for women as heads *(Pradhans)* of local councils *(Gram Panchayats)* has been mandated. This replaced traditional, appointed councils, which were completely male-run. The new system is supported by fiscal resources, regular elections, and quotas for women and members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes. I focus on the most decentralized and local of the three tiers, the *Gram Panchayat.*

The constitutional amendments mandated that not less than one third of *Gram Panchayat* heads be women.[5] I call *Pradhans* political gatekeepers because in India, they are the most influential local politicians in a given village. *Pradhans* preside over the *Gram Panchayat*, including at least two annual public meetings (*Gram Sabhas*). More importantly, they oversee implementation of public works, social justice projects, and land allocation. Given this authority, reservations are game-changing. Ensuring the presence of women in a position to control the enforcement of all legislation within a given locale was indeed revolutionary, particularly in light of what Chandra (2004) calls India's 'patronage democracy.'

Yet, the impact of reservations remains disputed. One body of research finds they fail to increase support for marginalized groups (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2010; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Jensenius 2015), instead creating leaders who are "tokens of powerful interests in the village" (Sharma 2004; Ban and Rao 2008, p.502). Additionally, female leaders face many forms of bias and resistance that can inhibit their effectiveness (Mayaram 2002).

In contrast, evidence also exists that reservations can and do shift government expenditures and policy towards women's preferences, particularly when lower caste women are in power (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-Figueras 2011). Reporting of crimes against women and police response improves (Iyer et al. 2012) and women are more likely to run in

[5]Titles vary, including *Adhyakhsa, Sarpanch,* or President. Council-based rule is ancient, but an effective *Panchayat* system did not exist prior to 1993 (Ghatak and Ghatak 2002).

future elections (Bhavnani 2009). In West Bengal, reservations diminish male perceptions of elected officials' ineffectiveness (Beaman et al. 2009) and increase familial aspirations for daughters (Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova 2012). In Rajasthan, reservations for Scheduled Castes improve political participation by the represented groups while building trust in political institutions, self-respect, solidarity and access to legal resources (Chauchard 2014). This evidence notwithstanding, studies of reservations have yet to test whether they help actualize other gender-equalizing reforms.

I study the impact of reservations on the enforcement of reforms expanding the rights of daughters to inherit property from a tiny ('notional') fragment to full equality, conditional on paternal death after reform.[6] Mabsout and Van Staveren (2010) posit that increasing women's resources in the face of discriminatory social institutions causes a "resource paradox," which actually reduces women's bargaining power. I contend that the ability of beneficiaries to access the state at the right time and in the right way is a necessary precursor for effective enforcement and lasting change.

Theoretical Framework

I construct a theory linking women's political representation to their economic empowerment. My first supposition is that women's ability to successfully secure property rights depends upon representation in local political institutions. These representatives—gatekeepers—can pressure bureaucrats to enforce women's property rights. My second supposition is that benefits to women from representation are contingent upon the anticipated "cost" of enforcement to those required to cede traditional claims. This cost varies with a given woman's ability to negotiate intra-household distribution of resources across multiple domains (inheritance, dowry, and related familial responsibilities).

The ability to negotiate property rights has global significance, given that "patriarchal

[6]On inheritance before and after gender-equalizing reform, see Figure A.9 & Note.

tradition and ancient social beliefs threaten women's land rights" in over half of all countries (Villa 2017). Reluctance to enforce women's land rights is often the crux of the problem (World Bank 2009, 150). Decentralization, apropos of India's *'Panchayat Raj'* reforms, is now a near-universal strategy to "improve the responsiveness and accountability of the state" (Channa and Faguet 2016, 2).

I propose that political representation fundamentally alters women's relationship to local bureaucracy. Where quotas for female local political representatives—gatekeepers—exist, a virtuous cycle is created: more women participate and engage the state as it becomes more accessible and responsive.

In India, the role of gatekeeper is assumed by the *Pradhan,* the elected head of local government. Absent female *Pradhans,* male local bureaucrats responsible for enforcing property rights (village revenue officials, hereafter VROs) typically argue that claiming rights is women's responsibility alone, and male *Pradhans* concur, adding they cannot guarantee protection for those women who do so (Sircar and Pal 2014, 15-16).[7]

VRO enforcement of women's rights is further limited because supporting brothers—by not registering sisters as legal heirs—facilitates local tax collection and minimizes conflict. According to one property lawyer, VROs "are only looking at putting down the name of the head of the family, who will pay the taxes."[8] The reluctance to formally enforce women's inheritance is rampant: out of 1,192 individuals—predominantly women—I interviewed across rural Andhra Pradesh, not a single female reported receiving ancestral land via a VRO-initiated land transfer. Officials familiar with women's rights are unwilling to formalize their inheritance for fear of "causing discord within the village or trouble within the family," unless the entire family unanimously requests it.[9] This reluctance is striking, given that all

[7]VROs (also known as *Patwaris or Karmacharis*) maintain records of land ownership and cultivation and prepare the list of legal heirs that superiors—Tehsildars—implement.

[8]Author's interview at AV College, Hyderabad, on 7 January, 2017.

[9]Author's interview with VROs in a District Office, Andhra Pradesh, 25 March, 2010.

women I study have at least limited rights to inherit their father's land.[10]

Official bias affects citizen behavior. Women frequently express uncertainty about how to approach public officials to secure their rights as well as concern about the consequences of doing so, given widespread harassment and social censure they usually receive upon entering public and political spaces (Mayaram 2002).

Where reservations for female *Pradhans* exist, women's relationship to local government is entirely different. All *Pradhans* "wield influence over revenue officers"—thanks to their ability to support or block VRO career advancement in the highly politicized land revenue system. However, female gatekeepers are more likely to "bring about a large scale change in action" toward women. They use the *Gram Sabha's* public forum to prioritize and resolve land disputes and take "a lead role in convincing those families who are denying land rights to women" (Vasavada and Rajgor 2015, 8). According to a trainer for the Tamil Nadu Women Panchayat Presidents' Federation, they have to fight to force the VROs to release "information on land records and deals" because the VRO "and the [male] *Panchayat* president often collude...by fudging land records" (Rao 2018). Backlash against female gatekeepers who unsettle these alliances has been so severe as to include murder (Ibid).

Female gatekeeper influence extends even to states like Bihar that are inegalitarian to the extreme. There, one female *Pradhan* used her position to settle 52 civil and 30 criminal cases during her first year in office (including a sixty-year inheritance dispute that resulted in the contested land being conveyed to an original defendant's granddaughter) by unearthing and verifying VRO land records and resolving disputes in the village court by convincing all parties to accept the distribution of property selected by random draw of lots (Ojha 2017).

In additional to examining the role of female *Pradhans* in facilitating title transfers and settling land disputes, I also consider the obstacles to challenging traditional inheritance rights when female representatives are involved. I suggest that the impact of quotas will vary based on the perceived "cost" to *status-quo* beneficiaries of the rights that female

[10]See note accompanying Figure A.9 on rights prior to gender-equalizing reform.

representatives are seeking to enforce. Pre-reform, where these rights are procedural and non-threatening enough for the cost to be only symbolic, I expect female gatekeepers to improve women's inheritance of 'notional' fragments of land. Unlike procedural rights, however, gender-equalizing property inheritance reforms require the relinquishment of tangible benefits and therefore, I expect quotas leading to amplified enforcement of these rights to generate a more intractable resistance. Furthermore, social norms about property inheritance are frequently intertwined with institutions that dictate familial obligation. This leads to two observable implications.

First, I propose that when female gatekeepers effectively enforce new land inheritance laws, a resulting backlash occurs which mitigates female empowerment or nullifies it altogether. This prediction is in line with a growing body of research finding resistance to India's gender-equalizing inheritance reforms across multiple domains: parents' increased pre-mortem land transfers to sons (Roy 2015); relative increases of male suicide rates (Anderson and Genicot 2015); and greater sex selection against daughters (Rosenblum 2015).

An Odisha-based woman's case exemplifies the magnitude of the conflict when a female *Pradhan* is present: in 2016 Sunana, 36, demanded her share of her recently-deceased father's nine-acre farmland. With the female-led *Panchayat* in the background, she made a straightforward claim to inheritance: "Land had been sold to finance the marriages of my two sisters. Since I had not married, I had an equal claim to a portion of the remaining land." Her brothers disagreed. "Die or run away - they would say every day." Two months later they chased her out, battering a wooden rod against her head until she lost consciousness. The *Panchayat* intervened, negotiating a portion of the ancestral home for Sunana and her mother. They procured a state pension and subsidized food, and made space for Sunana's tailoring shop in the community center. "Life would have been so different if I had known my options [i.e. *Pradhan*-led negotiation of rights] earlier," says Sunana (Awasthi 2017).

Fear of backlash by brothers to a sister's demand for inheritance was a common theme over my two years of field research. In one woman's words: "As a boy [inheritance] is his

right. So if [my parents] give [inheritance] to me, others will tell the boy he got less [than he should], so he will quarrel, litigate, fight. So they [parents] won't give and we won't ask."[11] Recent survey work confirms the strength of the opposition: 53 percent of 1,440 female respondents to a recent Landesa survey in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh report brothers will not accept a sister's claims to land (Sircar and Pal 2014, 12). Typically, pressure is brought on sisters to renounce rights. This can range from "encouragement" to sign away inheritance to explicit challenges: court cases or possession of land by force (Gowen 2016). Chowdhry (1997, 1026) suggests fears of "the property insecurity that results from women's new property inheritance rights" have led "rural patriarchal forces" to "pose the inheritance right of a daughter and a sister to be against that of the brother."

How do women surmount these hurdles? Female *Pradhans* are changing how women conceive of their rights. In the words of one lawyer: "Formally, no one educates women about their [legal inheritance] rights, [except] these [female political] leaders and the [local] women's groups [they support]." In contrast, where women are not the political gatekeepers "it is all about being proactive and coming forward to contest their rights" *alone.*[12]

How do female gatekeepers effectively apply this new political power? They revolutionize how women occupy the public sphere, create *new* public spaces for women's benefit, and re-purpose private spaces. In Maharashtra, female *Pradhans* explicitly encourage "women's attendance at public *Gram Sabha* meetings. As...women began participating...their views and opinions got reflected in the decision-making process. Gradually the resistance by opponents declined" (Birvaykar and Yadav 2012, 4). Another common strategy is the creation of new space where young and old women gather to learn their legal rights and the procedures for securing them. Finally, we see a shift in the private sphere, where women meet female elected "representatives at their homes and [confide] their problems" (Brown, Ananthpur, and Giovarelli 2002, 45). Women clearly benefit: sisters and daughters claim rights

[11]Author's interview No.13, 14 Nov. 2010, Chompi Village, Araku, Vishakapatanam, AP.

[12]Author's interview with R.B., 7 January 2017 at AV College, Hyderabad, AP.

to parental property without any "visible value judgment or social censure attached" (Ibid).

Accounts from across India confirm that reservations simultaneously alter women's public and private identities. In Banswara District, Rajasthan, "women's representation had generated self-confidence among women, changed their thinking and countered their fears. There was a perceived sense of unity among women on gender issues. This had increased women's participation and identification with the *Panchayat*" (Buch 2010, 171). As gatekeepers, women also alter parental attitudes about marriage, such as in Haryana where a mother notes she "not only gave up the *ghunghat* [veil] but also married off her two sons without taking dowry [from brides]" due to her female *Pradhan's* influence (JaagoRe 2014).

Pasupathi, a female gatekeeper based in Madurai district of Tamil Nadu "a region infamous for its girl-child killing" obtained government approval and funding for a women's community center on the village's common land. With Pasupathi at the helm, young and old women from Pullaneri village meet together to be educated about their legal prerogatives and how to fight for social change "from cradle [against female infanticide, which as a result is no longer common] to the classrooms (where there still are pressures)" and marriage, by countering expectations for expensive dowries (Girls Count 2016). Such public promotion of women's rights changes family dynamics. As another woman in the same district explains: "After the meetings, women have demanded their rightful share of property. In fact, brothers have given [shares] to their sisters. This happened because they know we're aware of our rights." The combination of legal acumen and opportunities to farm agricultural land has leveled the prior hierarchy in her family: "When we were young, father used to eat first at home. Now, all of us sit around and eat together" (Ibid).

My field research showed that the loss men expect and fear from reform deviates dramatically across individuals. I found that resistance by brothers diminishes as sisters propose ways to moderate their loss. Specifically, women entering marriage markets at or after receiving equal rights have agency to strike mutually-beneficial bargains with family members, precluding resistance by exchanging their traditional share of inheritance—monetary

dowry—for land inheritance. In contrast, women who have already exited marriage negotiations by the time a female gatekeeper is elected are at the mercy of their brothers.

A group of fathers confirmed the importance of marriage negotiations as the ideal time to distribute a daughter's share of land inheritance in lieu of dowry if that was to occur: "We will spend more money on daughters' marriage [that is, monetary dowry] via our land incomes and loans [from property]—this is why we are not in a position to give land to daughters. It would be an injustice to sons."[13] In other words, marriage negotiations are crucial to determining the balance of family resources that sons and daughters receive. As one VRO explained: "At the time of marriage, parents [may] consider giving daughters land (in place of monetary dowry)."[14] Such trades free up more ancestral resources for brothers.

Female *Pradhans* are particularly attuned to young women's need for support during this critical juncture. The greatest challenges occur when women are too young to marry legally (18 is both the legal marriage age and the mean for REDS 2006/9 round): one female gatekeeper elected in Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh, temporarily sheltered a fourteen year-old girl whose parents tried to force her out of school and into marriage—negotiating a return of her monetary dowry to fund future land inheritance.[15] Female gatekeepers also use their physical presence to ensure that land titles for plots divided equally between brothers and sisters at the time of a sister's marriage are properly documented and recorded by the VRO.[16] In one village run by a female *Pradhan,* half of 48 women I interviewed have land in their names, many via inheritance their parents gave equally to daughters and sons.[17]

As gatekeepers, women also alter broader parental attitudes about marriage. These negotiations are radically different when a female gatekeeper is not involved. Days before K.

[13]Author's FGD No.3, 29 November, 2011, Anantapur District, AP.

[14]Author's interview with a Tehsildar, 25 March, 2010, Khammam District, AP.

[15]Author's interview, YW & class, 18 January, 2016, Krishna District, AP

[16]Author's interview with N., 11 April, 2010, Krishna District, AP.

[17]Author's interview, 7 April, 2010, Village B., Khammam District, AP.

Bina Devi was married in Rajasthan, the typically all-male cadre of village elders assembled in her house as witnesses. They watched as she and her sister signed away their land inheritance shares to four brothers in exchange for receiving dowry. The ceremony is so common it has a (tragic) name: *haq tyag,* meaning "sacrifice of right." Ms. Devi explains that non-compliance with this 'voluntary' ritual has a cost: "If we don't do it, our family will boycott us. Our relationship with the family will break, and people will speak ill of us" (Chandran 2016).

In sum, marriage negotiations are decisive moments for formalizing or waiving women's property rights, and the time at which *Pradhans* have the opportunity to play a life-changing supporting role. In the next section, I test the hypotheses presented here: the importance of female gatekeepers—and the timing of women's access to them—for inheritance, and two mechanisms central to their impact: their ability to mobilize female public participation in *Gram Sabha* meetings and to mediate private, intra-household disputes.

Data and Identification Strategy

My primary dataset is the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER)'s Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS). I rely on the most recent 2006/9 round, which covers 8,659 households from 240 rural villages across 17 Indian states. In addition to standard demographic questions, the nationally representative survey records all land transfers between the household head, their siblings, parents, spouse, and children, plus adult household residents' political participation and perceptions of local governance. This data provides detailed accounting of individual property inheritance in contemporary India.

I study all female respondents born between 1956, when women gained symbolic property rights, and the year their state equalized their property rights, culminating in the national mandate of 2005 (1976-2005).[18] In total, the sample comprises 31,729 women with a mean

[18]Roy (2015) finds parental investment changes post-HSAA, so I exclude these births.

age of 31 years, 48 percent of whom (15,230) have fathers whose death occurs after their village *Pradhan* seat is reserved for women. On average, four percent of women inherit land (Tables A.6 and A.7).

Identification Strategy

I utilize India's quasi-random implementation of "reservations" for women as elected heads of village councils—constitutionally-mandated as of 1993—to identify representation's impact on enforcement of women's property inheritance rights. These rights were legislated at different times by the various Indian states. Thus, the year of "reform" varies from state to state. All culminated in the 2005 passage of a national mandate equalizing property inheritance rights for men and women (details in Figure A.9 Note). I compare daughters with fathers who die at or after the year their village *Pradhan* seat was reserved for a woman with those whose fathers died prior. If the father's revenue village (hereafter village; the division where ancestral property is typically located) has been reserved for a woman in any election occurring up to the year of his death, I code his daughter as *"treated"* by reservations. I focus on the time of paternal death as the relevant point for reform enforcement, as it determines a daughter's eligibility for gender-equal inheritance. She is eligible if her father dies post-reform. Reform timing varies by state, from 1976-2005 (Figure A.9). I estimate:

$$y_{isk} = \alpha_s + \beta_k + \gamma_{sk} + \delta' R_{is} + \delta'' D_{isk} + \delta''' D_{isk} * R_{is} + \theta X_{isk} + \epsilon_{isk} \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable of interest, y_{isk}, is a binary indicator of whether or not a daughter i, born in state s, in year k, inherits any land. It takes a value of 1 if a given woman inherits any land and zero otherwise. This outcome is the most parsimonious measure of impact. The independent variables of interest identify whether or not individuals are *treated* by reservations and eligible for gender-equal inheritance. D_{isk} is a binary indicator of *treatment:* whether a given daughter i, born in state s-specific cohort k, has a father

who died at or after the first year his village's *Pradhan* seat was reserved for a woman. R_{is} is a binary indicator of *eligibility:* whether daughter i's father dies after his state s legislates gender-equal inheritance rights. δ''''s coefficient indicates representation's impact on daughters eligible for reform. Women whose fathers die before village-level reservation and state-level reform are the control group. α_s is a placeholder for state fixed effects, to account for state characteristics that are invariant across birth cohorts. β_k represents birth year fixed effects, to capture changes in the economy, policy, or society that occur at the macro-level, affecting particular birth cohorts, γ_{sk} represents state-year of birth fixed effects, and X_{isk} is a vector of predominantly household-level control variables: number of female and male siblings, caste status, total number of children, region, and wealth status. Standard errors are clustered at the village level to address concerns about geographic correlation and heteroscedasticity. I present OLS analysis for ease of interpretation.[19]

The identifying assumption is quasi-random roll-out for reservations. To test this, I confirm balance across villages with and without reservations for female *Pradhans* (Table A.1) and individuals whose fathers die pre- versus post-implementation of reservations (Table A.2); check that REDS records of reservation status consistently predict the *Pradhan's* gender for each village's elections (Table A.3), and at paternal death (Table A.4); map spatial variation in reservation implementation (Figures A.2, A.3, A.4); compile the first comprehensive summary of their implementation mechanisms (Table A.5); exclude states without as-if-random or timely implementation of reservations and villages not genetically matched and confirm this results in a balanced sample of villages (Tables A.8, A.9, A.10, Figure A.8).

Next, I test whether female gatekeepers are more effective at enforcing inheritance reform when female constituents have the greatest intra-household bargaining power. To investigate this hypothesis, I exploit the leverage women gain over resource distribution at the time they enter marriage negotiations, i.e. the point at which a daughter is typically given monetary dowry. If female *Pradhans* are effective advocates for women who enter marriage markets

[19]See Tables A.15, A.19, A.23, A.24 for logit analysis; see A.12 and A.13 for replications.

eligible for gender-equal inheritance—when they can assist women in securing land titles in their names rather than dowries, typically given to in-laws—access to female representatives should be particularly valuable.

Here, I analyze the differential effect of reservations and reform for daughters aged less than twenty at the time of reform (the treatment group) versus twenty or more (the control group). I choose a cut-off point of age twenty because this is the time by which three quarters of daughters have begun marriage negotiations (Figure A.7). I use the following equation to estimate the impact of reservations and reform, conditional on women's age at reform:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{isk} =& \alpha_s + \beta_k + \gamma_{sk} + \delta' R_{isk} + \delta'' D_{isk} + \theta' B_{is(k'-20\leq k\leq k'-1)} + \\ & \delta''' R_{isk} * D_{isk} + \theta'' B_{is(k'-20\leq k\leq k'-1)} * R_{isk} + \theta''' B_{is(k'-20\leq k\leq k'-1)} * D_{isk} + \\ & \delta'''' B_{is(k'-20\leq k\leq k'-1)} * R_{isk} * D_{isk} + \lambda X_{isk} + \epsilon_{isk} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The main coefficient of interest (δ'''') measures the impact of reservations for women entering marriage markets as they become eligible for reform ($B_{is(k'-20\leq k\leq k'-1)} = 1$). If reservations enable female *Pradhans* to catalyze negotiations for a daughter's inheritance rights in a manner benefiting all members—*by renouncing monetary dowry in favor of land inheritance*—I expect to see behavior change most dramatically amongst women entering marriage markets.

Analysis

Figure 1 uses the raw data to map variation in women's land inheritance alongside treatment by reservations and eligibility for reform, respectively. There is a sharp, discontinuous jump in the likelihood of inheritance for women whose fathers die after reservations are implemented in their village prior to inheritance reform (Figure 1a). The non-overlapping confidence intervals for treated and untreated women indicate that treatment by reservations significantly increases the likelihood of female inheritance (as my 'gatekeeper theory' predicts). However, post-reform, reservations may cause resistance (Figure 1b). This suggests

female gatekeepers are relevant for enforcement of women's inherited property rights.

Reservations & Women's Inheritance

I begin by testing the impact of reservations on the likelihood of female inheritance in the presence versus the absence of gender-equal rights for three samples of 'target' women whom reform was intended to benefit (those with landowning parents who are subject to Hindu law): the full sample, the sample excluding the subset of states with biased mechanisms to implement reservations, and this subset also excluding late implementers.

Table 1 presents the regression results using Equation 1. The effect of reservations pre-reform, δ'', is positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence level across all specifications (Columns 1-4, *p-values=0.058-0.087*). Absent reform, women with fathers who die after reservations inherit 6 percentage points more land—increasing the frequency of female inheritance from 10.3 to 16.3 percent. The magnitude is small, but an increase of six percentage points in a population of 1.34 billion, where 92.4% of the rural population—67% of India—live in landholding families implies 23.6 million more women would inherit land. Absent reservations, daughters whose fathers die after gender-equalizing reform do not inherit more land than others after controlling for family characteristics (Columns 2-4). Political representation is thus a powerful tool motivating women to claim inheritance pre-reform.

In contrast, the impact of reservations post-reform, δ''', is significantly less than zero for all specifications. Amongst women eligible for reform, treatment by reservations significantly decreases the likelihood of inheritance by 8-9 percentage points (Table 1, Columns 1-4, *p-values=0.006-0.009*), potentially indicating male resistance where enforcement of gender-equal inheritance rights is credible. These results are robust to excluding sisters without brothers (Table A.14), logistic regression analysis of the full, target, and genetically matched samples following Sekhon and Titiunik (2012)'s replication study (Table A.15), OLS analysis of the full and genetically matched samples (Table A.16), and placebo tests (Table A.17).[20]

[20]All logit regression analysis results are robust to use of village-level fixed effects; the same

[Table 1]

To understand how successful reservations are at facilitating women's demands for substantial inheritance, I examine whether reservations change the amount of land women actually inherit rather than simply their probability of inheriting. Post-reform, if female gatekeepers are successful, this share of inheritance should grow. However, if resistance by brothers dominates, representation should not increase the acreage women inherit. Regressions using Equation 1's format with area inherited as the dependent variable indicate paternal death post- versus pre-reservations increases women's inheritance by 0.08-0.09 acres (Table A.18, Columns 2-4, *p-values=0.038-0.060*; Figure A.5). In landholding Hindu families, women's mean ownership is 0.03 acres; reservations *pre-reform* quadruple this amount. In contrast, post-reform, women do not inherit larger shares. These results suggest backlash by brothers when they anticipate female gatekeepers will enforce equal inheritance rights.

Reform, Reservations & Marriage Markets

If backlash by brothers to the enforcement of property rights is responsive to the anticipated cost, we should see resistance and its impact on inheritance by sisters change alongside variation in their demands. To test this hypothesis, I exploit women's influence over intra-household resource distribution at the time they enter marriage negotiations. If women trade monetary dowry (an indirect benefit) for land inheritance in their own names (a direct benefit), this should lower the net cost of gender-equalizing reform to brothers' subsequent inheritance. Results (Table 1) are robust to excluding sisters without brothers (Table A.14), logistic regression analysis of the target, full, and matched samples (Table A.19), OLS analysis of the full and matched samples (Table A.20), and placebo tests (Table A.21).[21]

holds for OLS analysis except for the interaction term, for which standard errors increase in some specifications, reducing its statistical significance. Results available upon request.

[21]Results are robust to use of village-level fixed effects, and are available upon request.

Considering δ''', reservations continue to have a significant, negative impact on women's likelihood of inheritance for those who have exited marriage markets by the time they receive gender-equal inheritance rights. Paternal death post-reservations and reform decreases women's inheritance by 9-10 percentage points, significant at the 99 percent confidence level across all specifications (Table 1, Columns 5-8, *p-values=0.004-0.007*). This confirms female representation spurs resistance to gender-equalizing inheritance reform, particularly amongst women whose demands are perceived as costly because they have already received a dowry.

Second, I calculate the additional effect of reservations on enforcement of reform amongst women who are entering marriage markets when they gain gender-equal inheritance rights, i.e. women aged less than twenty at reform with fathers who die post-reform (δ''''). Treatment by reservations increases these women's probability of inheriting land by 15-19 percentage points, significant at the 99 percent confidence level for all specifications (Table 1, Columns 5-8, *p-values=0.002-0.007*; Figures A.10 and A.12). Paternal death post- versus pre-reform makes these women with access to female gatekeepers 10.3 percentage points more likely to inherit land (Figure A.6). This lends support to the hypothesis that where women can utilize the bargaining power of female representatives while their marriages are being brokered and lower the cost to brothers of equal land inheritance rights, they experience a lasting gain: property in their name.

Overall, Table 1 provides evidence that quotas are a powerful inducement for women to claim equal property rights. In contrast, placebo tests that measure the simple or complex impact of reservations find no significant effect (Tables A.17, A.21). Pre-reform, reservations increase the frequency and magnitude of female inheritance. Post-reform, reservations result in fewer women inheriting land *but only where reform is costly to brothers.*

I next investigate the mechanisms through which women's local political representation may alter enforcement of female inheritance rights and subsequent behavior through two channels: political (participation in and responsiveness of the local government) and economic (the dynamics of dowry exchange).

Reservations and Political Participation

How does exogenously imposing local political representation for women catalyze enforcement of gender-equalizing inheritance reform? I first explore the political impact of female representation, asking: Do reservations encourage women to more easily voice demands, including those for the enforcement of legal rights, by increasing their willingness to engage with local government? Prior research finds conflicting evidence based on studies of distinct regions of India (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Ban and Rao 2008). NCAER's REDS 2006/9 round enables me to identify the effect of reservations across 17 major Indian states.

Here, I examine the impact of *current* reservations for the gatekeeper on women's *current* participation in local governance to ensure maximum accuracy of recall on participation (prior treatment—tied to paternal death—captured gatekeeper impact on inheritance):

$$y_{ivsk} = \alpha_V + \beta_k + \gamma F_{ivsk} + \delta r_{vs} + \gamma' F_{ivsk} * r_{vs} + \mu X_{ivsk} + \epsilon_{ivsk} \tag{3}$$

The dependent variable of interest, y_{ivsk}, is a binary indicator of whether a given adult citizen, i, residing in revenue village v, located in state s, born in year k, acknowledges participating in the most recent meeting of the *Gram Sabha,* convened by the gatekeeper (*Pradhan*). I study the influence of gender, where F_{ivsk} equals 1 when an individual is female; a revenue village's treatment by the latest reservations, r_{vs}: 1 when the *Pradhan* is currently reserved for women; and their interaction. Given the importance of local institutions for implementing reservations, tables use fixed effects for individual (encompassing) village of residence (α_V), birth year (β_k), and the vector of household-level control variables in Equations 1-2.

If reservations improve women's engagement with the state, I expect to observe heightened attendance by women at *Gram Sabha* meetings where villages are currently reserved for a female *Pradhan*. Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression analysis.

[Table 2]

The impact of gender, γ, is negative and significant across all specifications, confirming

that men dominate local governance (Chhibber 2002). Indeed, women are 17-29 percentage points less likely than men to report participating in the most recent village *Gram Sabha* meeting (Table 2, Columns 1-4, *p-values=0.000*). Reservations (δ) significantly reduce overall participation by about 23 percentage points (Table 2, Columns 3-4, *p-values=0.000*). The additional effect of reservations on women, γ', increases participation by 7-9 percentage points, significant at the 95-99 percent confidence levels for all samples (Table 2, Columns 1-4, *p-values=0.002-0.017*; see also Table A.22). Female gatekeepers nearly halve the gender gap in participation in all specifications with controls. However, this gain for women comes at the cost of men's engagement, given the significant negative coefficient on reservations (δ). This supports the consistent finding of increased intra-family distributional conflict over scarce property resources where reservations are in place (Tables 1, A.18, Figure A.11).

These findings provide preliminary support for my proposed political mechanism: reservations differentially increase women's participation in local government, exposing gatekeepers to greater contact with female constituents. This increases women's capacity to exert public pressure on gatekeepers to be responsive.[22] Indeed, citizen demands in political fora frequently center around rights enforcement (Kruks-Wisner 2011). According to a State Women's Commission Head: "After 1993 [reservations], there was a lot of change... Before, men just sat in *Panchayat* meetings, but now women participate, speak up. Because of the *Panchayat Raj* Amendments, there is a shift in political leadership... [But] social empowerment must occur within the household—husbands must accept wives' power and independence and not interfere with politics...This takes time."[23]

Reservations and Dispute Resolution

Next, I consider the ability of reservations to alter *private,* intra-household negotiations over land rights. I propose that female gatekeepers empower women entering marriage markets to

[22]Table A.11 finds women's political participation is positively correlated with inheritance.

[23]Author's personal interview, 24 January, 2014; Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.

claim inheritance rights without encountering backlash explicitly because they are effective mediators. In one woman *Pradhan's* words: "Our people should not knock at the court doors. They should not set foot inside the police station. They would feel humiliated by compromising issues elsewhere. This should be settled in the Panchayat itself" (Peraje 2011, 3). If this holds more generally, I expect to see more males and females evaluating their elected representative as highly effective at mediating social disputes—including over land and marriage—where the *Pradhan* seat is reserved for a woman. If female gatekeepers are effective but biased, I anticipate women will differentially assess them as highly effective. OLS regression analysis follows Equation 3, with the main dependent variable being a three tier measure of the current gatekeeper's success at resolving social conflicts: from "high" efficacy (3), to "medium" (2) and "low" (1). Table 2 presents results (Columns 5-8).

Analysis finds significant improvements of 54-56 percentage points in assessments by women of gatekeeper efficacy where reservations are in place (Table 2, Columns 5-8, *p-values=0.000*). Reservations have no additional benefit for women. This suggests reservations provide an effective mediator for *all* household members willing to engage the state on private, social disputes—the bulk of which are likely to be over the related issues of land and marriage. As a State Women's Commission Head noted: "Women...move differently, as elected officials they will be talking [directly] to women and families. Women, as opposed to men, will try to get these problems sorted out."[24] Results support the hypothesis that female gatekeepers enable women to collaboratively renegotiate contested familial resources.

Reservations and Dowry

For female gatekeepers to be significant sources of support for women, they should alter private, economic transactions within families as well as public, political behavior. In particular, we should see women who enter marriage markets with equal inheritance rights and access to female *Pradhans* negotiating a broader set of entitlements, trading monetary

[24]Author's personal interview, 24 January, 2014, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.

dowries for personally receiving titles to ancestral property. I test this hypothesis with help from NCAER's 2006/9 REDS question about the amount of monetary dowry each female respondent received at marriage.

I analyze monetary dowries using OLS regression analysis in the form of Equation 2. Table 3 presents the results. If female gatekeepers increase women's ability to demand land inheritance rights at the time of marriage negotiations, I expect to see fewer monetary dowries for the subset of women who enter marriage markets with gender-equal inheritance rights when reservations exist (δ''''). Indeed, these women are 10-28 percentage points less likely to receive dowry than women who enter marriage markets without gender-equal inheritance rights and a potent political voice. Results are significant at the 95-99.9 percent confidence levels, and robust to OLS analysis of the full and genetically-matched samples (Table A.20) and logit analysis using the full, genetically-matched, and target samples (Table A.24).

[Table 3]

Overall, analysis presents a nuanced picture of the ability of female representations to enforce gender-equalizing land inheritance reform in India. When women's property rights are limited, reservations that exogenously impose female gatekeepers enable women to demand and receive effective enforcement of land inheritance rights (Tables 1, A.18). Reservations increase women's ability to demand effective enforcement of economic rights via political participation, and improve all evaluations of local officials' efficacy at resolving social disputes including those involving land rights (Table 2).

However, representation-enabled enforcement of gender-equal inheritance rights bears a higher cost for men, potentially decreasing their access to scarce ancestral resources and their political engagement (Table 2). Reservations may thus catalyze intra-family conflict leading brothers to resist gender-equal inheritance rights (Table 1). Indeed, the act of claiming such rights is viewed as inherently destabilizing traditional norms. As a senior researcher on North India explains, "In the past, in order to return a brother's love, one would never claim land.

Now girls are willing to put their foot down and demand [equal] rights..."[25]

The enforcement of gender-equal land rights does present one source of optimism about the ability of female representatives to foster broader economic equality: when women enter traditional inheritance negotiations—marriage markets—with female representation and equal inheritance rights, they can negotiate mutually-beneficial economic exchanges with brothers. This diminishes the cost of reform to brothers, reducing backlash while increasing the realization of women's economic rights (Tables 1, 3).

Conclusion

Quotas that increase women's local political representation provide an effective channel for them to demand enforcement of the property inheritance rights that have been theirs since 2005 nationally. Representation enables women to lobby pivotal local officials—gatekeepers—for such enforcement while simultaneously seeking resolution to multiple land-related disputes. Across India, where 'reservations' are in place, women are more likely to inherit property. However, political representation coupled with enforcement of gender-equalizing property inheritance rights has an unintended consequence—male resistance—which decreases women's inheritance. Backlash is strongest against women unable to negotiate acceptable trade-offs.

In contrast, women entering marriage markets around or after reform (those aged less than twenty at reform) can leverage reservations to effectively demand rights, while at the same time reducing the "cost" to brothers by renegotiating entitlements to household wealth across multiple domains. This represents a net gain for women, who part with dowry in favor of land titled in their own names.

In sum, women's descriptive representation can improve local access to property rights in democracies with limited enforcement capacity such as India. Yet, resistance accompa-

[25]Author's personal interview, 29 January, 2014, Delhi, India.

nies these changes when representation occurs alongside meaningful enforcement of women's economic entitlements. In the case of India's inheritance reforms, legislators expected gender-equal inheritance rights would increase the value and position of daughters.[26] Instead, growing evidence of increased dowry costs, male suicide rates, and female infanticide suggests inheritance reform is costly for females and their families (Anderson and Genicot 2015; Roy 2015; Rosenblum 2015). This places a burden on policy-makers to identify and mobilize appropriate support for vulnerable groups so that reform becomes a catalyst for mutually-beneficial shifts in resource distribution.

This study is relevant for scholars and policy-makers interested in reducing gender inequities as well as other forms of social, economic, and political imbalances around the globe. My findings underline the necessity of further research into the consequences of reforms aiming to simultaneously reshape economic rights and social conventions. Globally, such reforms span the gamut from more inclusive regulation of labor markets to broader refugee rights. Reform often has contradictory effects, generating backlash alongside improving equality—from the American Civil Rights movement to India's abolition of "Untouchability" with subsequent political and economic quotas. Overall, this paper's analysis suggests that quotas for women's representation will be successful at incentivizing economic gender equality only to the extent they also provide women with resources to pursue enforcement of these rights in ways that open space for all parties to benefit.

At the end of the day, how do women advance? Connecting economic rights to political voice is not a new concept. Historically, women's suffrage in the West has been tied to property inheritance. In other regions of the world, women have gained the right to political participation without the ability to inherit and control property. The promise of my "gatekeeper" theory is that quotas for female representatives open doors for women to claim what may be tiny plots of land, but with transformational power.

[26]Author's interview with a Member of Parliament, Delhi, 2014, Ibid

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Bina Agarwal, Jim Alt, Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Neil Beck, Jonathan Bendor, Sonia Bhalotra, Rikhil Bhavnani, Lisa Blaydes, Teddy Brett, Maria Carreri, Kanchan Chandra, Pradeep Chhibber, Klaus Deininger, Jim Fearon, Aparajita Goyal, Avner Greif, Michael Harsch, Dorothy Kronick, Saumitra Jha, Francesca R. Jensenius, Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner, Beatriz Magaloni, Christopher Paik, Arturas Rosenas, Sanchari Roy, and Hannah Simpson for invaluable feedback. I would like to thank Andrew Foster for kindly providing access to the REDS 2006 dataset and Dr. Hari Nagarajan and everyone at the National Council of Applied Economic Research, in particular Mr. Jai Pal Singh for help in navigating the dataset. Aruna, Anupam Chatterjee, D. Gopi, Jamuna Pachuri, and the rest of Andhra Pradesh's Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty made this research possible. Components of this research were carried out on the High Performance Computing resources at New York University Abu Dhabi. Clarissa Lehne, Mai Mahmoud, Rajiv Naresh, Aliz Toth, Ankita Banerjea, and Norbert Monti provided essential research assistance. I also thank three anonymous reviewers for their constructive advice. Previous versions of this manuscript were presented at the University of California, Berkeley, the London School of Economics, the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, and Stanford University workshops, and at the American Political Science Association's Annual Conference and the Annual Conference on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. All errors are my own fault.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369–1401.

Agarwal, Bina 1994. *A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albertus, Michael 2015. *Autocracy & Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Siwan and Garance Genicot 2015. "Suicide and Property Rights in India." *Journal of Development Economics 114*: 64–78.

Atkeson, Lonna Rae and Nancy Carrillo 2007. "More is Better: The Influence of Collective Female Descriptive Representation on External Efficacy." *Politics & Gender* 3(1): 79–101.

Awasthi, Puja 2017. "Beaten but unbowed - Sunanda Sahoo's silent struggle." *People's Archive of Rural India*, July 5. `https://bit.ly/2wAEWtm` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Ban, Radu and Vijayendra Rao 2008. "Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women's Reservations on Village Democracies in South India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 56(3): 501–530.

Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo 2011. *Poor Economics*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee 2010. "Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India." *The American Economic Review* 100(4): 1572–1600.

Barnes, Tiffany D. and Stephanie M. Burchard 2013. "Engendering Politics: The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(7): 767–790.

Beaman, Lori, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova 2009. "Powerful Women: Female Leadership and Gender Bias." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(4): 1497–1540.

Beaman, Lori, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova 2010. "Political Reservation and Substantive Representation: Evidence from Indian Village Councils." In *India policy forum*, Volume 7, 159–201. National Council of Applied Economic Research.

Beaman, Lori, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova 2012. "Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India." *Science* 335(6068): 582–586.

Becker, Gary 1981. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1415–1451.

Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* 103(1): 23–35.

Birvaykar, Santosh and Lakshmi Yadav 2012. "Women in Governance." In Sriparna G. Chaudhuri and Sourabh Ghosh, eds., *Thus Spoke the Press Vol. 7*. New Delhi: The Hunger Project, 1–8.

Brown, Jennifer, Kripa Ananthpur, and Renee Giovarelli 2002. "Women's Access and Rights to Land in Karnataka." *Research Report*, Rural Development Institute, Seattle, WA.

Buch, Nirmala 2010. *From Oppression to Assertion: Women and Panchayats in India*. New Delhi: Routledge India.

Burns, Nancy, Kay L. Schlozman, and Sidney Verba 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bush, Sarah S. 2011. "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures." *International Organization* 65(1): 103–137.

Chandra, Kanchan 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chandran, Rina 2016. "Forced by tradition to give up inheritance, Indian women embrace property ownership." *Reuters*, November 2. `https://reut.rs/2IErLfT` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Channa, Anila and Jean-Paul Faguet 2016. "Decentralization of health and education in developing countries: a quality-adjusted review of the empirical literature." *World Bank Research Observer* 31(2): 199–241.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409–1443.

Chauchard, Simon 2014. "Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India." *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 403–422.

Chhibber, Pradeep 2002. "Why are Some Women Politically Active? The Household, Public Space, and Political Participation in India." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(3–5): 409–429.

Chowdhry, Prem 1997. "Enforcing Cultural Codes: Gender and Violence in Northern India." *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(19): 1019–1028.

Chowdhry, Prem 2009. "Editor's Note." In Prem Chowdhry, ed., *Gender Discrimination in Land Ownership*. SAGE Publications, xv–xxxv.

Clayton, Amanda 2015. "Women's Political Engagement under Quota-Mandated Female Representation: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(3): 333–369.

Clots-Figueras, Irma 2011. "Women in Politics: Evidence from the Indian States." *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7): 664–690.

Dasgupta, Aditya, Kishore Gawande, and Devesh Kapur 2017. "(When) Do Anti-Poverty Programs Reduce Violence? India's Rural Employment Guarantee and Maoist Conflict." *International Organization 71*: 605–632.

De Soto, Hernando 2000. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.* New York: Basic Books.

Deininger, Klaus, Aparajita Goyal, and Hari Nagarajan 2013. "Women's Inheritance Rights and Intergenerational Transmission of Resources in India." *Journal of Human Resources* 48(1): 114–141.

Desai, Satyajeet A. 2010. *Mulla: Hindu Law, 21st Edition.* Nagpur: Lexis Nexis India.

Dunning, Thad and Janhavi Nilekani 2013. "Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils." *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 35–56.

Fouka, Vasiliki 2016. "Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US Schools after World War I." Working Paper No. 591, Stanford Center for International Development.

Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless 2014. "Uncovering the Origins of the Gender Gap in Political Ambition." *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 499–519.

Ghatak, Maitreesh and Maitreya Ghatak 2002. "Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal." *Economic and Political Weekly* 37(1): 45–58.

Girls Count 2016. "Case Study 6: Pasupathi's efforts in Pullaneri Village. Campaign in Tamil Nadu." *Girls Count.* `https://bit.ly/2KWEcSy` (accessed 26 April, 2018).

Gowen, Annie 2016. "It's Not Easy for Women to Own Land in India. One Woman Died Fighting for Hers." *The Washington Post*, September 29. `https://wapo.st/2K6fVYU` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4): 725–740.

Herring, Ronald 1983. *Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Land Reform in South Asia.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra, and Petia Topalova 2012. "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4): 165–93.

JaagoRe 2014. "5 Women Sarpanch Leaders Showing India the Way Forward." *JaagoRe*. `https://bit.ly/2IgQ14f` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Jensenius, Francesca 2015. "Development from Representation? A Study of Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7(3): 196–220.

John, Mary E. 2007. "Women in Power? Gender, Caste and the Politics of Local Urban Governance." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(9): 3986–3993.

Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle 2011. "Making Claims: Citizenship and Service Delivery in Rural India." *MIT Political Science Department Working Paper No. 16*.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. "Politics of Presence? Congresswomen and Symbolic Representation." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(1): 81–99.

Mabsout, Ramzi and Irene Van Staveren 2010. "Disentangling Bargaining Power from Individual and Household Level to Institutions: Evidence on Women's Position in Ethiopia." *World Development* 38(5): 783–796.

Mansbridge, Jane 1983. *Beyond Adversary Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mansbridge, Jane 1999. "On the Idea that Participation Makes Better Citizens." In Stephen L. Elkin and Karen E. Soltan, eds., *Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 291–325.

Mayaram, Shail 2002. "New Modes of Violence: The Backlash Against Women in the Panchayat System." In Karin Kapadia, ed., *The Violence of Development*. London: Zed Books, 393–424.

Mendelberg, Tali, Christopher Karpowitz, and Nicholas Goedert 2014. "Does Descriptive Representation Facilitate Women's Distinctive Voice? How Gender Composition and Decision Rules Affect Deliberation." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 291–306.

Norris, Pippa and Mona Lena Krook 2009. "One of Us: Multilevel Models Examining the Impact of Descriptive Representation on Civic Engagement." APSA 2009 Meeting Paper.

North, Douglass and Robert Thomas 1973. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803–832.

O'Brien, Diana Z. and Johanna Rickne 2016. "Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 112–126.

Ojha, Anil K. 2017. "Woman sarpanch in Bihar settles 20-year-old land dispute in 6 days." *Hindustan Times*, June 16. `https://bit.ly/2ImKMjq` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Okimoto, Tyler G. and Victoria L. Brescoll 2010. "The Price of Power: Power Seeking and Backlash Against Female Politicians." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 37(2): 923–936.

Peraje, N. Karanta 2011. "A Bold Leadership for the Panchayat Court." In Sriparna G. Chaudhuri and Sourabh Ghosh, eds., *Thus Spoke the Press Vol. 6*. New Delhi: The Hunger Project, 1–6.

Posner, Eric 2000. *Law and Social Norms*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rao, Bhanupriya 2018. "Tamil Nadu's Women Leaders Live, Work In The Shadow of Violence." *India Spend*, April 21. `https://bit.ly/2qNdsvk` (accessed 26 April, 2018).

Reingold, Beth and Jessica Harrell 2010. "The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement: Does Party Matter?" *Political Research Quarterly* 63(2): 280–294.

Rosenblum, Daniel 2015. "Unintended Consequences of Women's Inheritance Rights on Female Mortality in India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 63(2): 223–248.

Roy, Sanchari 2015. "Empowering Women? Inheritance Rights, Female Education and Dowry Payments in India." *Journal of Development Economics 114*: 233–251.

Sachs, Jeffrey 2005. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Books.

Sekhon, Jasjeet and Rocio Titiunik 2012. "When Natural Experiments are Neither Natural Nor Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 106(01): 35–57.

Sharma, Kumud 2004. "From Representation to Presence: The Paradox of Power and Powerlessness." In D. Bandyopadhyay and Amitava Mukherjee, eds., *New Issues in Panchayati Raj*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 48–66.

Sircar, Ashok and Sohini Pal 2014. "The Formal and Informal Barriers in the Implementation of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005." Technical report, Landesa.

Vasavada, Shilpa and Meena Rajgor 2015. "Role of PRIs in Asserting Women's Inheritance Rights to Land: Experience and Learning of Working Group of Women and Land Ownership, Gujarat." *Working Group for Women and Land Ownership*.

Villa, Monique 2017. "Women own less than 20% of the world's land." *World Economic Forum*, January 11. `https://bit.ly/2kcqlKn` (accessed 26 March, 2018).

Wolbrecht, Christina and David E. Campbell 2007. "Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 921–939.

World Bank 2009. "Gender Issues in Land Policy and Administration." Research Report, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Biographical Statement

Rachel Brulé (rachel.brule@nyu.edu) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Division of Social Science at New York University Abu Dhabi, in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Figures & Tables

Figure 1: Reservation's Impact on Women's Inheritance



a) Women whose father died pre-reform.

b) Women whose father died post reform.

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), 2006/9. The sample includes Hindu women from landowning families who were born post 1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) but prior to their state-specific HSAA's passage. Those women are excluded whose fathers reside in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). The x-axis represents when an individual's father passed away relative to the introduction of reservations in the father's village. The y-axis represents the probability of inheritance. Each point on the graph represents the average probability of inheritance for individuals whose fathers passed away t years after the first reservation for an elected female head of their village.

Table 1. Reservation's Impact on Women's Inheritance

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late	(5) Target	(6) Target	(7) Target-NR	(8) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform	-0.05***	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.04**	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Aged $<$ 20 at reform					0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Aged $<$ 20 at reform * Father died post reform					-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Aged $<$ 20 at reform * Father died post reservations					-0.13**	-0.17**	-0.17*	-0.17*
					(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Aged $<$ 20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations					0.15**	0.18**	0.19**	0.19**
					(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08
N	11826	11826	10698	10259	11826	11826	10698	10259

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "Target" includes only landed, Hindu women who were born post 1956 Hindu Succession Act, but prior to their state-specific HSAA's passage. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

Table 2. Reservation's Impact on Women's Participation in *Gram Sabha* and Pradhan's Effectiveness

	(1) Attendance All	(2) Attendance All	(3) Attendance All-NR	(4) Attendance All-NR-late	(5) Effectiveness All	(6) Effectiveness All-NR	(7) Effectiveness All-NR	(8) Effectiveness All-NR-late
Female	-0.29***	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.05***	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latest pradhan seat reserved for woman	-0.59***	0.03	-0.23***	-0.23***	0.56***	0.56***	0.54***	0.54***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female * Reservations	0.09**	0.09**	0.07*	0.07*	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.43	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.20
N	23570	23570	18765	18300	22343	22343	18013	17571

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. For Columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not a respondent attended the latest *Gram Sabha*. In the control group, 41 percent of men and 11 percent of women participate on average. For Columns (5)-(8), the dependent variable is a 3-tier scale representing respondents' evaluation of the *Pradhan's* "Ability to solve social problems, such as disputes over land, marriage, etc.". Ranking varies from "high" (3), to "medium" (2) or "low" (1). For maximum accuracy of recall, analysis is restricted to the current *Pradhan*. In the control group, mean effectiveness rankings are 2.02 for men and 1.97 for women. "All" includes all adult (aged 18 years or more) women residing in surveyed households born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "All-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010).Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: REDS 2006/2009, NCAER.

Table 3. Reservations' Impact on Women's Dowry

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	-0.01	0.03	0.05**	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reservations	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	-0.65***	-0.18***	-0.19***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.11**	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	0.27***	0.11**	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	-0.28***	-0.14**	-0.10*	-0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.55	0.78	0.80	0.80
N	11826	11826	10698	10259

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women receive dowry from their natal families. "Target" includes only landed, Hindu women born post 1965 Hindu Succession Act, but prior to state-specific Hindu Succession Amendment Act. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

A Online Appendix Tables

Table A.1. Descriptive statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	280805.24	283301.58	285668.90	2367.32
				(0.08)
% women in the subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.53	0.48	−0.05
				(−1.99)
Village population: first panchayat period	4870.86	4700.90	5275.92	575.01
				(0.62)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat	12.15	12.31	11.80	−0.51
				(−0.80)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.21	0.22	0.19	−0.04
				(−1.44)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.10	0.10	0.10	−0.01
				(−0.17)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.37	0.39	0.31	−0.08
				(−1.63)
% Hindu in village population currently	0.87	0.87	0.87	−0.01
				(−0.17)
% Muslims in village population currently	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.01
				(0.62)
% SCs in village population currently	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−1.02)
% STs in village population currently	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.04
				(1.42)
% OBCs in village population currently	0.09	0.08	0.13	0.05
				(1.82)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population currently	0.26	0.27	0.26	−0.01
				(−0.44)
% own land in village population currently	0.47	0.48	0.45	−0.04
				(−1.11)
Average price: unirrigated land currently (Rs.)	103740.33	113642.86	90859.38	−22783.48
				(−1.03)
Average price: residential land currently (Rs.)	417181.82	432931.30	406238.10	−26693.20
				(−0.36)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.19	0.17	0.23	0.06
				(1.06)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.07
				(1.28)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.15	0.15	0.13	−0.02
				(−0.38)
Number of villages	240	151	82	

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.2. Balance Test: Father's Death Post vs. Pre-Reservations

	(1) All States	(2) Father Dies Post Reservations	(3) Pre Reservations	(4) difference (t-score)
Father: secondary or more education	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.01
				(1.07)
Mother: secondary or more education	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.03
				(4.73)
Parents = top 20% landholders (15 acres or more)	0.32	0.36	0.28	−0.08
				(−8.93)
Patriarch's land (acres)	10.42	11.49	8.86	−2.63
				(−8.52)
Subject to Hindu law (Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist)	0.95	0.96	0.95	−0.01
				(−1.61)
Low Caste	0.73	0.73	0.71	−0.03
				(−3.06)
Endogenous variables				
Age (years)	30.26	31.23	37.07	5.83
				(25.56)
Education (years completed)	5.61	4.27	5.13	0.86
				(8.69)
Siblings: proportion of sisters	0.41	0.39	0.46	0.08
				(17.84)
Inherit land?	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.06
				(13.87)
Total land inherited	0.20	0.08	0.33	0.24
				(8.35)
Observations	19396	5984	4774	

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. Village level means are provided. The sample includes all landed women who were born after the national Hindu Succession Act (1956) and prior to their state's legislation of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, excluding states whose implementation of reservations either does not appear to be as-if random or is late (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, and Jharkhand). Columns 2-4 compare only those individuals with information about father's death year and village-level implementation of reservations. I classify several factors as endogenous: age, because older fathers are likely to pass away earlier; education and proportion of sisters, because prior work demonstrates that exposure to property rights reform influences parental investment in education and a given family's proportion of sisters (Anderson and Genicot 2015; Rosenblum 2015; Roy 2015; Bhalotra et al. 2017; Lawry et al. 2016); and total land inherited, as I find that land inheritance and the amount of land inherited are also affected by reform. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.3. Reservation's impact on *Pradhan's* gender

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All-NR	(4) All-NR-late
Pradhan seat is reserved for women	0.89***	0.90***	0.92***	0.92***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj. R-sq	0.75	0.76	0.82	0.81
N	699	673	520	505

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations correspond to a village in a particular election cycle. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the *Pradhan* is female. "All" includes all villages in the dataset. Columns (2)-(4) include election cycles as of 1993 when reservations for women were implemented. "All-NR" excludes villages from states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and villages from the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

Table A.4. Impact of father's death post-reservations on *Pradhan's* gender at father's death

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All-NR	(6) All-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.45	0.45
N	12457	12285	12285	12285	10086	10006

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the *Pradhan* is female at the time of father's death. "All" includes all individuals in the dataset. Columns (2)-(6) include individuals whose father died as of 1993 when reservations for women were implemented. "All-NR" excludes individuals from states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and individuals from the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: REDS 2006/9, NCAER.

Table A.5. Women's Reservations' Timing, Selection, & Rotation, by Indian State

State	Panchayat Act (Year)	First Election	Random	Selection Method	Rotation	Increase to 50% Quota
Andhra Pradesh	1994	1995	Not Random	Sex ratio	Unknown	2011
Bihar	1993	2006	As-if Random	Population Size	Without replacement, every 10 years	2006
Delhi	1993	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	No
Chhattisgarh	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2008
Gujarat	1994	1995	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	No
Haryana	1994	1994	Random	Draw of lots	Unknown	No
Himachal Pradesh	1994	1995	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	Without replacement, every 5 years	2010
Jharkhand	2001	2010	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	2005
Karnataka	1993	1993	As-if Random	Population size: panchayat seats	No two consecutive reservations	No
Kerala	1994	1995	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	No two consecutive reservations	No
Madhya Pradesh	1994	1994	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	Yes, n.d.
Maharashtra	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2011
Orissa	1994	1997	Random	Alphabetical order (every 3rd)	Without replacement, every 5 years	2011
Punjab	1994	1998	Unknown	Unknown	Every 10 years	No
Rajasthan	1994	1995	Random	Draw of lots	Without replacement, every 5 years	2008
Tamil Nadu	1994	1996	Not Random	Proportion of women in population	Without replacement, every 10 years	2016
Uttar Pradesh	1994	1995	As-if Random	Population size	No two consecutive reservations	No
West Bengal	1994	1998	Random	Legislative Assembly numbers (every 3rd, ascending)	Without replacement, random number table	2012

Main Sources: Panchayat Raj Acts, Election Rules, & Department of Rural Development & Panchayat Raj. See following note for details.

Note: Coding Procedure for Table A.5: Women's Reservations

To compile this table, I consulted each state's *Panchayati Raj* Act, *Panchayat* Election Rules, Department of Rural Development and *Panchayat Raj*, according to document availability. I also utilize invaluable secondary analysis by Mishra (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Paul (2006), Nilekani (2010), Ghosh et al. (2011), and Shankar (2016). Three facets of the data presented in this table are worth noting.

First, variation in the timing of State Panchayat Act's passage, from 1993 to 2001, and the subsequent timing of each state's first Panchayat elections, which start in 1994 and end in 2010. While most states implemented initial elections and reservations within two years of constitutional amendments' passage, two states took more than five years to implement the amendments. In Bihar, the fourteen year gap between the Panchayat Act's passage in 1993 and elections in 2006 is due to legal challenges. For Jharkhand, state reorganization explains the nine-year gap between the Panchayat Act's ratification in 2001 and the first round of elections in 2010.

Second, states had discretion over how to implement reservations' rotation. Nearly half of states with available documentation (6 of 14) randomly select female *pradhans* via draw of lots or in alphabetic (panchayat) or numeric (legislative assemblies' arbitrary numeric code) order. Another quarter (4) utilize as-if random methods to assign reservations, mainly based on population size to determine reservation status. Thus, most states select *pradhan's* reservation status using a random or as-if random mechanism. The remaining quarter of states use a potentially non-random selection mechanism: the proportion of women in the population. If the proportion of women in a village's population is an indicator of pre-existing norms about women's value, this selection criteria could bias the sample of villages receiving reservations earlier to the subset with norms that particularly value women. This might be true if villages with norms promoting women are less likely to contain households that limit female births via the illegal but widespread practice of sex selection. This suggests two methods of identifying appropriate samples for analysis: first, excluding states with non-

random selection of reservation status, and second, excluding both states with non-random selection mechanisms and late-implementing states. Both methods lead to highly comparable "control" villages, where women's reservations have yet to be implemented, and "treatment" villages where women's reservations have already been implemented.

Third and finally, rotation of women's reservations mainly occurs every five-year electoral cycle. Three exceptions exist: the Indian states of Bihar, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. Two of these exceptions—Bihar and Tamil Nadu—are already excluded from tests that study states that are timely-implementers using as-if random selection mechanisms only. As a result, variation in reservations' rotation period is unlikely to introduce bias into analysis. However, the impact of reservations' varied rotation mechanisms is a worthy topic for future research.

Table A.6. Descriptive Statistics, Individuals

	All	Women	Men
Subject to Hindu law (Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist)	0.92	0.92	0.92
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Inherit land?	0.13	0.04	0.24
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.43)
Total land inherited	0.43	0.14	0.74
	(1.85)	(1.18)	(2.33)
Age (years)	30.65	30.79	30.51
	(12.78)	(12.36)	(13.21)
Education (years completed)	6.43	5.50	7.29
	(4.51)	(4.36)	(4.47)
Siblings: proportion of sisters	0.38	0.41	0.35
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Father: secondary or more education	0.36	0.37	0.36
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Mother: secondary or more education	0.13	0.13	0.13
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Parents = top 20% landholders (15acres+)	0.21	0.21	0.21
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Patriarch's land (acres)	6.75	6.88	6.62
	(16.43)	(17.78)	(14.86)
Scheduled Caste	0.18	0.18	0.19
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Scheduled Tribe	0.10	0.10	0.10
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Other Backward Caste	0.26	0.25	0.27
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Muslim	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Total number of children (household head)	3.87	3.95	3.79
	(2.03)	(2.05)	(2.00)
Western states (Gujarat, Maharashtra)	0.13	0.12	0.13
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Wealthy: Head's parents own 8 acres or more	0.25	0.26	0.25
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Patriarch: number of daughters	2.08	2.22	1.92
	(1.51)	(1.55)	(1.45)
Patriarch: number of sons	3.04	2.91	3.18
	(1.50)	(1.46)	(1.52)
Observations	61569	31729	29840

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes men and women born post-Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA in their states. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A.7. Descriptive Statistics, Main Dependent and Independent Variables

	All	Women	Men
Aged <20 at reform	0.38	0.37	0.39
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Pradhan seat ever reserved for a woman	0.69	0.69	0.69
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Latest pradhan seat reserved for a woman	0.33	0.33	0.33
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Father died post reservations	0.42	0.48	0.34
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.47)
Father died post reform	0.31	0.41	0.20
	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.40)
Father died post reform & reservations	0.36	0.44	0.25
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.43)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.12	0.15	0.10
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.30)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	0.14	0.15	0.14
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	0.14	0.15	0.13
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Inherit land?	0.13	0.04	0.24
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.43)
Area of inherited plot fragment	3.46	3.57	3.45
	(5.10)	(7.93)	(4.76)
Any dowry given (for a woman)	0.34	0.48	−−
	(0.48)	(0.50)	−−
Last gram sabha: attended? (%)	0.23	0.10	0.34
	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.47)
Current pradhan: how able to resolve social problems (scale of 1-3)?	1.96	1.95	1.97
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.74)
Observations	61569	31729	29840

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes all men and women born post-Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA in their state. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A.8. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, excluding non-random implementers

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	294652.41	299450.78	299793.30	342.52
				(0.01)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.53	0.46	−0.07
				(−1.91)
Village population: first panchayat period	4096.88	3999.12	4383.50	384.38
				(0.49)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	12.56	12.58	12.49	−0.09
				(−0.12)
% SCs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.22	0.23	0.20	−0.03
				(−0.94)
% STs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.11	0.12	0.11	−0.00
				(−0.07)
% OBCs panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.41	0.30	−0.10
				(−2.03)
% Hindus in village population currently	0.87	0.88	0.86	−0.02
				(−0.44)
% Muslims in village population currently	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.01
				(0.51)
% SCs in village population currently	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−0.74)
% STs in village population currently	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.05
				(1.35)
% OBCs in village population currently	0.09	0.08	0.12	0.04
				(1.09)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population currently	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.02
				(0.61)
% own land in village population currently	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.01
				(0.22)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	87992.70	98526.88	68153.85	−30373.04
				(−1.34)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	417477.12	419767.86	447702.70	27934.85
				(0.31)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.19	0.18	0.25	0.08
				(1.13)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.14	0.11	0.24	0.12
				(1.83)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.14	0.15	0.12	−0.03
				(−0.50)
Number of villages	189	131	51	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.9. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, excluding non-random and late implementers

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	301560.08	299316.64	304971.68	5655.04
				(0.18)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.52	0.54	0.47	−0.07
				(−1.66)
Village population: first panchayat period	4096.88	3999.12	4383.50	384.38
				(0.47)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	12.56	12.58	12.49	−0.09
				(−0.12)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.22	0.23	0.20	−0.03
				(−0.91)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.11	0.12	0.11	−0.00
				(−0.07)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.41	0.30	−0.10
				(−1.98)
% Hindus in village population now	0.88	0.88	0.87	−0.01
				(−0.35)
% Muslims in village population now	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.01
				(0.29)
% SCs in village population now	0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.01
				(−0.58)
% STs in village population now	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.05
				(1.68)
% OBCs in village population now	0.09	0.08	0.13	0.05
				(1.38)
% own <2 acres of land in village population now	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.02
				(0.68)
% own land in village population now	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.01
				(0.39)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	89574.80	98769.23	66333.33	−32435.90
				(−0.92)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	418604.17	416036.36	426911.76	10875.40
				(0.09)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.20	0.18	0.27	0.09
				(1.36)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.14	0.10	0.23	0.13
				(2.24)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.14	0.14	0.12	−0.01
				(−0.25)
Number of villages	179	129	48	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays coefficients for t tests of the equality of means, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.10. Descriptive Statistics: Villages without vs. with reservations, matched sample

	(1) All Villages mean	(2) With Reservations mean	(3) Without Reservations mean	(4) Difference of means difference (t-score)
Subdistrict population, 1991 census	280589.91	275056.09	285668.90	10612.81 (0.32)
% women in subdistrict (tehsil) population, 1991 census	0.51	0.54	0.48	−0.06 (−1.87)
Village population: first panchayat period	5054.18	5036.24	5075.17	38.93 (0.03)
Number of panchayat members: first panchayat period	11.69	11.83	11.54	−0.28 (−0.38)
% SC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.21	0.22	0.18	−0.04 (−1.20)
% ST panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.02 (0.64)
% OBC panchayat members: first panchayat period	0.38	0.43	0.31	−0.12 (−1.99)
% Hindus in village population now	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.03 (0.68)
% Muslims in village population now	0.07	0.07	0.07	−0.01 (−0.28)
% SCs in village population now	0.05	0.06	0.04	−0.02 (−0.97)
% STs in village population now	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.04 (1.10)
% OBCs in village population now	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.06 (1.81)
% own less than 2 acres of land in village population now	0.26	0.28	0.24	−0.04 (−1.39)
% own land in village population now	0.47	0.48	0.45	−0.04 (−0.86)
Average price: unirrigated land now (Rs.)	104944.44	117780.00	93879.31	−23900.69 (−1.09)
Average price: residential land now (Rs.)	386398.23	365964.91	407196.43	41231.52 (0.54)
% villages experienced drought, 1999	0.20	0.18	0.22	0.04 (0.59)
% villages experienced flood, 1999	0.15	0.12	0.18	0.06 (0.97)
% villages experienced pests, 1999	0.15	0.16	0.14	−0.03 (−0.45)
Number of villages	140	67	73	

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This table includes genetically matched villages only, where genetic matching follows Sekhon and Titiunik (2012). Village level means are provided. Column (4) displays beta coefficients, t statistics are in parentheses.

Table A.11. Descriptive Statistics: Women's Mean Probability of Land Inheritance Conditional on Village Rate of Women's *Gram Sabha* Participation, Currently-Reserved Villages

	(1) Individual Observations Mean Pr(Inherit)	(2) Village Observations Mean Pr(Inherit)
Above Average Participation	0.047	0.050
Average - Below Average Participation	0.028	0.026
Total (in currently-reserved villages)	0.030	0.029
Observations	16147	71

Source: Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. Village-level means are calculated by assessing all women's participation in the most recent *Gram Sabha* conducted in each village currently reserved for a female *Pradhan.* Women's 'average' participation at the village level is calculated slightly differently for each specification. Column 1 calculates the average of all village-level averages using the entire population of women in REDS 2006/9 sample of currently reserved villages. Here, 9.7 percent of women participated in the latest *Gram Sabha* meeting, on average. Column 2 collapses observations by villages, such that women's 'average' participation is calculated over the total number of villages currently reserved for a female *Pradhan.* Using this method, 11.1 percent of women participated in the most recent *Gram Sabha* meeting, on average. The correlation of "above average" participation with women's inheritance is positive in both cases: 0.1097 for individual-level observations (Column 1) and 0.1637 for village-level observations (Column 2).

Table A.12. Reform's Short & Long-term Impact on Women's Land Inheritance, Replication of Goyal et al. (2013)

	(1) Hindu	(2) Hindu	(3) Non Hindu	(4) Non Hindu
Female	-0.52**	-0.46***	0.18	-0.63*
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Female * father dies post-HSAA	0.09*		0.04	
	(0.04)		(0.14)	
Female * father's death pre-1-6 years of reform		-0.04		0.04
		(0.05)		(0.22)
Female * death post-0-5 years reform		0.04		-0.15
		(0.06)		(0.21)
Female * death post-6+ years reform		0.09*		0.14
		(0.04)		(0.16)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-sq	0.58	0.59	0.71	0.72
N	10794	10852	608	618

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent inherits land. The sample includes only the household head and his or her siblings and is restricted to residents of four early reformer states: Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. The direction of coefficients displayed corresponds to those with significance in Columns 1,2, and 5 (restructured to be comparable to Columns 1-2) of Table 2 in Goyal et al. (2013: 128-9). I replicate Goyal and her co-authors' use of fixed effects for household, year of birth, and gender-specific year of birth, and include state fixed effects for congruence with my main analysis. Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey 2006/9.

Table A.13. Reform's Impact on Inheritance, Replication of Roy (2015)

	(1) Inherit land?	(2) Inherit land?	(3) Inherit land?	(4) Inherit land?	(5) Inherit land?	(6) Inherit land?	(7) Inherit land?	(8) Inherit land?
Aged 1-10 at reform	0.06	0.06^{+}	0.11^{+}	0.10^{+}	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Aged 11-15 at reform	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Aged 16-20 at reform	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Grandfather died post reform	0.14*	0.14*	0.20*	0.21*				
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)				
Aged 1-10 at reform * Grandfather died post reform	-0.16*	-0.16*	-0.21^{+}	-0.21^{+}				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)				
Aged 11-15 at reform* Grandfather died post reform	-0.08	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11				
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)				
Aged 16-20 at reform* Grandfather died post reform	-0.06	-0.05	-0.15^{+}	-0.14^{+}				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)				
Father died post reform					0.06	0.06	0.08	0.09
					(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged 1-10 at reform * Father died post reform					-0.05	-0.07	-0.10	-0.16
					(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Aged 11-15 at reform* Father died post reform					-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00
					(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Aged 16-20 at reform* Father died post reform					-0.12*	-0.11**	-0.07^{+}	-0.09*
					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Father's year of death FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Grandfather's year of death FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Adj. R-sq	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.11	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.12
N	1006	1006	954	954	3142	3142	2685	2685

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent inherits land. This dataset uses the NCAER's REDS 2006/9 round. Following Roy (2015), the sample includes only women from early reformer states: Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra. Controls include caste status, the total number of children in a family, and a binary indicator for wealth status, which approximates the continuous variable that Roy uses to measure household income. The significance and direction of the coefficients on either father's or grandfather's death post-reform, as relevant, corresponds to those reported in Appendix Table A2, Columns 3-6 of Roy (2015: 245). There are two sources of difference between Roy (2015)'s results and the replication I am able to construct. First, while we both identify a negative impact of reform for the 16-20 age group, this is not significant in Roy's analysis. The second is the number of observations. Roy assembles a dataset of roughly twice the size compared to what I can construct using REDS 2006/9 round: ranging from 2128-2228 observations for specifications using grandfather's death to 4313-5054 when using father's death. I am only able to identify 957-1012 observations for specifications using the grandfather's year of death, and 2686-3143 for specifications using the father's year of death.

Table A.14. Reservation's Impact on Women's Inheritance, Excluding Sisters without Brothers

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late	(5) Target	(6) Target	(7) Target-NR	(8) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.06^{+}	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.06	0.06*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform	0.07*	0.07*	0.08*	0.08*	0.10*	0.10*	0.11*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.14**	-0.14***	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.21**	-0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform					0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform					-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06
					(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations					-0.07	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.10*
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations					0.19**	0.23***	0.23**	0.23**
					(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
N	5503	5503	4931	4727	5503	5503	4931	4727

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. The sample is limited to women with male siblings. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families who were born post 1956 Hindu Succession Act, but prior to their state-specific HSAA's passage. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.15. Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance; Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.51^{+}	0.48^{+}	0.47	0.68*	0.70*	0.71*
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Father died post reform	-0.62**	0.24	-0.01	0.36	0.45^{+}	0.49^{+}
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Father died post reform & reservations	-1.70***	-1.34***	-1.32*	-1.49***	-1.55***	-1.59***
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.64)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21
Observations	15197	15197	8453	9993	8932	8575

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA).""Matched" refers to the subsample of genetically matched women. "Target" in columns (4)-(6) includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.16. Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance, OLS

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched
Father died post reservations	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Father died post reform	-0.04***	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & post reservations	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05
N	17737	17737	9672

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA)."Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. For the genetically matched sample, the direction of coefficients is consistent with the main results in Table 1, although the standard errors increase, likely due to the halving of the sample in the matching process. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.17. Placebo test: Reservation's Impact on Women's Likelihood of Inheritance

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target - NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Father died post 1984	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.21^{+}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & 1984	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.22^{+}	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(.)	(.)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08
N	17727	17727	9662	11818	10693	10254

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. Rather than including a binary indicator of father's death post-reservations, these specifications include an indicator of whether or not a father dies in or after 1984, ten years before the introduction of women's reservations. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.18. Reservation's impact on Women's Area of Inheritance (acres)

	(1) Target	(2) Target	(3) Target-NR	(4) Target-NR-late
Father died post reservations	0.06	0.08^{+}	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Father died post reform	-0.08	-0.09	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
N	11826	11826	10698	10259

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the land area that women inherit, in acres. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.19. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance, Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	−0.33	−0.25	−0.32	0.13	−0.00	−0.05
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.62)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Father died post reservations	0.51^{+}	0.49^{+}	0.49	0.69*	0.70*	0.70*
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Father died post reform	−0.64**	0.24	0.01	0.35	0.43	0.47^{+}
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Father died post reform & post reservations	−1.67***	−1.34***	−1.34*	−1.47***	−1.53***	−1.56***
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.65)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.20	0.05	−0.20	−0.04	0.25	0.24
	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.67)	(0.51)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	−10.71***	−11.06***	−12.03***	−7.96***	−7.82***	−9.32***
	(1.65)	(1.50)	(2.27)	(1.90)	(1.91)	(1.92)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	10.53***	11.04***	12.03***	7.78***	7.65***	9.14***
	(1.80)	(1.63)	(2.41)	(1.95)	(1.95)	(1.97)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21
Observations	15197	15197	8453	9993	8932	8575

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subsample. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female *Pradhans* randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. In the full specification with controls (Column 2), the double interaction for "Aged <20 at reform" and "Father died post reservations" has standard errors which vary by 0.0005 across rounds of regressions, ranging from 1.4948 to 1.4953, when estimating these results to four decimal places. This does not alter the term's statistical significance. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.20. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance and Dowry

	(1) Inherit All	(2) Inherit All	(3) Inherit Matched	(4) Dowry All	(5) Dowry All	(6) Dowry Matched
Aged <20 at reform	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reservations	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04^{+}	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.66***	-0.17***	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & post reservations	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06	-0.12***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.10*	0.04^{+}	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	-0.08*	-0.09**	-0.09^{+}	0.27***	0.08*	0.07^{+}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	0.09*	0.11**	0.11^{+}	-0.32***	-0.12***	-0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.53	0.78	0.79
N	17737	17737	9672	17737	17737	9672

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(3) is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. In Columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women receive dowry from their natal families. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.21. Placebo test: Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Inheritance

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Father died in 1984	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.20^{+}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Father died post reform & 1984	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	-0.21^{+}	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(.)	(.)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(.)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(.)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post 1984	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & 1984	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(.)	(.)	(0.05)	(.)	(.)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08
N	17727	17727	9662	11818	10693	10254

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women inherit. Rather than including a binary indicator of father's death post-reservations, these specifications include an indicator of whether or not a father dies in or after 1984, ten years before the introduction of women's reservations. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" uses the genetically matched subset of women. "Target" includes only landed, Hindu women born post-1956 HSA and pre-HSAA. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.22. Reservation's Impact: Attendance and Pradhan Effectiveness, OLS, Matched Samples

	(1) Attendance Matched	(2) Effectiveness Matched
Female	-0.21***	-0.03^{+}
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latest Pradhan seat reserved for woman	-0.25***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female * Reservations	0.12**	0.04^{+}
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Village FE	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-sq	0.47	0.27
N	13399	12703

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women attended the latest *Gram Sabha* in Column (1). In Column (2) the dependent variable is a 3-tier scale representing respondents' evaluation of the *Pradhan's* "Ability to solve social problems, such as disputes over land, marriage, etc." Ranking varies from "high" (3), to "medium" (2) or "low" (1). For both specifications the sample includes the subset of adult (aged 18 years or more) women residing in surveyed households within genetically matched villages. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.23. Reservation's Impact on Women's Participation in *Gram Sabha*, Logit model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) All-NR	(5) All-NR-late
Female	-2.90***	-2.11***	-2.16***	-2.08***	-2.06***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Latest pradhan seat reserved for woman	-1.52***	-1.75***	-1.45***	0.34***	0.34***
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Female * Reservations	0.26	0.30	0.34	0.12	0.14
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.47
N	22235	22235	12710	17446	17074

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women attended the latest *gram sabha*. "All" includes all adult (aged 18 years or more) women residing in surveyed households. "All-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "All-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). "Matched" refers to the subsample of genetically matched individuals. Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

Table A.24. Reservations' Dynamic Impact on Women's Dowry, Logit Model

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Matched	(4) Target	(5) Target-NR	(6) Target-NR-late
Aged <20 at reform	0.37	0.39	0.21	0.71	2.29**	2.23**
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.64)	(0.76)	(0.78)
Father died post reservations	0.23	0.12	-0.12	-0.02	-0.22	-0.20
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Father died post reform	-3.73***	-1.49***	-1.32***	-1.66***	-1.76***	-1.77***
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Father died post reform & reservations	-0.78**	-0.08	-0.24	0.27	0.43	0.44
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform	0.04	0.53	0.84+	0.48	-1.57*	-1.61*
	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.77)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reservations	13.20***	12.83***	10.52***	12.21***	11.53***	11.75***
	(0.52)	(0.72)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.89)
Aged <20 at reform * Father died post reform & reservations	-13.93***	-13.98***	-11.50***	-13.20***	-11.93***	-12.17***
	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.84)	(0.96)	(0.89)	(0.91)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.444	0.744	0.759	0.739	0.760	0.761
N	16446	16446	9092	10768	9670	9288

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not women receive dowry from their families. "All" includes all women born post-1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and pre-state Hindu Succession Act Amendment (HSAA). "Matched" refers to the genetically matched subsample. "Target" includes only Hindu women from landholding families. "Target-NR" excludes states that do not assign reservations for female pradhans randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). "Target-NR-late" excludes non-random implementers of reservations and the two states to implement women's reservations over 10 years after Constitutional Amendments: Bihar (2006) and Jharkhand (2010). Controls include caste status, total number of children, number of female and male siblings, region, and wealth status. In the full specification without controls (Column 1), the double interaction for "Aged <20 at reform" and "Father died post reservations" has standard errors which vary by 0.01 across 500 rounds of regressions, ranging from 0.51 to 0.52 when estimating this specification to two decimal places. This variation does not alter the term's statistical significance. When estimating this specification to four decimal places, the standard errors consistently round to 0.52. Source: NCAER REDS 2006/9.

A.1 Online Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Qualitative Interview Districts, Andhra Pradesh State

Census of India, 2001 political boundaries. Limited interviews also occurred in Hyderabad and in Warangal District, North West of Khammam. Following the 2014 Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, the state was bifrucated into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana States. Khammam, Ranga Reddy (Rangareddi) and Warangal are now located in Telangana, while the remainder of my interview districts remain in Andhra Pradesh.

Figure A.2. Village-level Distribution of Reservations for Female Pradhans



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.3. Indian States by Implementation Date of Women's Reservations



Sources: State Panchayat Raj Acts and Election Rules, Departments of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj (summarized in Appendix Table A.5), and NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.4. Indian States by Proportion of Individuals in Ever Reserved Villages



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.5. Reservations' Impact on Women's Land Inheritance (acres)



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes Hindu women from landholding families who were born pre-reform in their respective states and post-1956 HSA. Those women are excluded whose fathers reside in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Each point on the graph represents the average area (in acres) of land inherited in a certain acquisition year for individuals whose land acquisition year is known.

Figure A.6. Comparison of Net Effects for Table 1: Reservations' Impact on Daughters' Inheritance



a) Women entering marriage markets at reform.

b) Women exiting marriage markets at reform.

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes women born into Hindu, landholding families after the 1956 HSA, but before state-specific HSAA. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). For Figure A.6a, the net effect of reform pre-reservations is calculated using the following formula: $\delta' + \theta''$, the net effect of reform post-reservations is calculated by $\delta' + \delta''' + \theta'' + \delta''''$, their difference is given by $\delta''' + \delta''''$ from Equation 2. For Figure A.6b, the net effect of reform pre-reservations is given by δ', the net effect of reform post-reservations is $\delta' + \delta'''$.

Figure A.7. Cumulative Distribution of Marriage Age for Women



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. This graph includes all women in the sample. The x-axis represents marriage age. The y-axis represents the cumulative probability of a woman marrying at a given age. Each point on the graph represents the cumulative probability of marriage at a certain age.

Figure A.8. Density Plots for the Percentage of Women in Sub-district Population



Figure A.9. Coding Strategy: Treatment by Women's Reservations and Eligibility for Gender-Equal Inheritance Rights



*A woman receives gender equal inheritance rights if she is eligible under both conditions (a) and (b).
** A woman is able to effectively transfer formal land inheritance rights where reservations for female heads of local government (*pradhans)* have been in place before/at the time of the patriarch's death.
[1] States amended the Hindu Succession Act in varied years, beginning with Kerala in 1976, followed by Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994. As of 2005, a national amendment applied reform to all states, making all Indian citizens subject to Hindu Law (Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs) with fathers who die post 2005 without wills eligible for gender equal inheritance rights.

Note to Figure A.9: Application of Hindu Succession Amendment Act

Inheritance or 'succession' is an item which forms a part of the 'Concurrent List' (i.e. List-III (Seventh Schedule)) of the Indian constitution, thereby granting both states and the central government the right to legislate on it. In addition, inheritance is subject to "personal law," dictated by the faith of each citizen. Here, I focus on "Hindu" personal law, which applies to Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Parsees as well as Hindus.

One of Independent India's first legislative acts was to pass the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (hereafter the 'HSA'). This reform provided unbalanced inheritance rights to daughters as compared with sons. Each daughter whose father died after reform's passage received a notional share of her father's land, equal to a portion of the share that a son inherits upon his Hindu father's death intestate. Sons became members of the *coparcenary* upon birth and received their own independent share of ancestral property. At that time, *the coparcenary* included three generations of *all-male* descendants, each of whom received a direct right upon birth to an independent share of the joint family property. Upon the death of his father, a son received his (indirect) share of the father's property alongside his own independent (or direct) share. Additionally, sons could demand partition of the joint family property while daughters could not. In contrast, a daughter's share was generally small enough to be purely symbolic, as it was derived exclusively from her *father's* share in the joint family property, as separate from each other Hindu male coparcener's independent share. Unlike sons, daughters never received an independent (or direct) share of the joint family property *upon birth,* as did their brothers, or at any point later in life. Roy (2016) notes that a daughter's "notional" portion (or indirect share) of her father's piece of the joint family property was determined on a per capita basis, calculated according to the hypothetical partitioning of a given Hindu Joint Family property, as if partition had taken place just before paternal death.

To provide a more concrete example, Chowdhry (2009) explains the relative gender imbalance of inheritance shares in a minimal family arrangement, which is the most generous to daughters. She considers a family comprised of three members: a father, a son and a daugh-

ter. Following the father's death post HSA, the son inherits a three-fourth share—including one half by "virtue of right by birth" i.e., his direct share as a member of the coparcenary and "one-fourth by succession under the Act—while the daughter gets only one-fourth", that is an indirect share (Chowdhry 2009, xvii). In addition, for daughters, inheritance granted them quite circumscribed access to a *limited estate,* which meant that while they could enjoy profits from the family property during their lives, they were not allowed to alienate (sell) their share, unlike brothers.

Following state-level amendments of the Hindu Succession Act, eligible daughters gained a share of her joint family property which was exactly equivalent to that of sons in the same family. Different states amended the Hindu Succession Act in different years. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra each enacted inheritance reform between the years of 1976 and 1994 (1976, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1994, respectively). Thereafter, in 2005, the national government enacted legislation which would be applicable in all Indian states. The text of reform is nearly identical across states. The major exception is Kerala, which abolished the Hindu Joint Family as an entity rather than amending the Hindu Succession Act, but still shares the HSAA's goal of establishing gender-equal inheritance rights. The primary change legislated by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act (HSAA) was to deem daughters members of the *coparcenary*, each of whom are each entitled to an independent share in the Hindu Joint Family property upon birth. The HSAA also made women's agency equivalent to that of men, enabling daughters to alienate their share, demand partition of Hindu Joint Family property, and to become the *karta* (manager) of the joint family property.

Figure A.10. Comparisons of Coefficient Sizes for Table 1: Women's Probability of Inheritance



a) Columns 1-4 b) Columns 5-8

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9.

Figure A.11. Net Effects for Table 1: Women's Probability of Inheritance



Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes Hindu women born into landholding families after the 1956 Hindu Sucession Act, but before state-specific HSAA reforms. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Net effects are based on Table 1, Column 3. The effect of reservations post-reform is calculated by $\delta' + \delta'''$, the effect of reform post-reservations is given by $\delta'' + \delta'''$. The total effect of reform and reservations is calculated by using the following formula: $\delta'' + \delta' + \delta'''$ in Equation 1.

Figure A.12. Comparisons of Coefficient Sizes: Reservations' Impact on Daughters' Likelihood of Receiving Dowry



a) Women entering marriage markets at reform.

b) Women exiting marriage markets at reform.

Source: NCAER Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 2006/9. The sample includes women born into Hindu, landholding families after the 1956 HSA, but before the state-specific HSAA. It excludes women born in states that do not assign reservations randomly (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu). Net effects are based on Table 3's OLS regression estimates. For Figure A.12a, the net effect of reservations pre-reform is calculated using the following formula: $\delta'' + \theta'''$, the net effect of reservations post-reform is calculated by $\delta'' + \delta''' + \theta''' + \delta''''$, their difference is given by $\delta''' + \delta''''$ from Equation 2. For Figure A.12b, the net effect of reservations pre-reform is given by δ'', the net effect of reservations post-reform is $\delta'' + \delta'''$.